

THE MAN WHO  
DIDN'T  
WIN THE WAR

AN EXPOSURE OF  
LOYD GEORGISM

BY  
CENTURION

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
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# THE MAN WHO DIDN'T WIN THE WAR

AN EXPOSURE OF LLOYD GEORGISM

BY

CENTURION

(pseud. of John Hartigan Morgan)

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## INTRODUCTION

THESE articles are reprinted in the form in which they were published in the *National Review* from April to August, with only alteration in tenses and slight changes required by such events as the death of Collins and Griffith. They deal with the recent career of Mr. Lloyd George from the historical standpoint ; and it may be claimed that the views expressed in them—which have not been modified—have now been largely verified by events. There are necessarily some repetitions, as each article appeared independently, but they have been permitted to stand that the articles may, as far as possible, appear as when they were first published.

The Conservative Party, since these articles were written, has recovered its freedom and ended the Coalition. But Mr. Lloyd George has already prepared it for a malignant opposition on his part, and has told it how he will exult over its difficulties. He said at Manchester on October 14th :

I shall watch how we are to pay the United States of America what we owe her, and forgive every other country

## INTRODUCTION

everything they owe us—have a better Army and Navy and Air Force, have more houses for everybody, while at the same time rents are not economic, strengthen your educational system, and give more to the unemployed and yet make the taxation of this country lighter. . . . This is one of the joys I have in store.

The statement of facts which is contained in these articles may therefore be of value in defeating this opposition, and showing the public more of the rule of shame and dis-honour from which it has at last escaped. It is much that with Mr. Lloyd George's disappearance the Conservatives who were mainly responsible for the deplorable surrender to Sinn Fein have quitted office. The party and the country will breathe the more freely for their withdrawal.

And now the nation may be of good hope. What will happen at an English General Election no human being can prophesy with any certainty. But if the Conservative leaders are firm and faithful, they will find that the country will support them. If they waver, run away, and try to make terms with Mr. Lloyd George—that evil genius of our modern politics—they will correspondingly alienate supporters and drive them into the arms of the Labour Party. I think it best to assume that they will be true to their trust. In that case they

are sure of a majority, and it is worth very briefly considering what their policy should be.

By the action of the Coalition the Conservative party is bound to the treaty with Sinn Fein. It cannot repudiate that treaty without breach of faith, but it can insist that it be strictly observed in the letter and in the spirit. Nor should it be forgotten that almost the only merit this treaty possesses is that, for the first time for half a century, it gives England back her freedom. For fifty years her politics have been dominated by the Irish Separatist vote. The Irish Separatist vote is gone. Twice only since 1886 have the Liberals obtained a majority over the Conservatives, without Irish and Labour aid, and on one of those occasions (in 1910) the majority was but 2 votes.

England can therefore be no longer bought and sold by Liberal brokers. As for Labour, it is much more likely to take votes from the Liberal than from the Conservative ranks. Conservatism, indeed, has every reason to expect a considerable accession of strength from working men who have voted against the Coalition because they have regarded it (rightly or wrongly) as a mere organization of profiteers "on the make." They are in revolt against the extreme Socialists who are

helping themselves to trade-union funds for political purposes, and they are sick of the Coalition regime of perpetual inspection, regulation and arbitrary meddling with their private affairs in such matter as the "pussyfoot" restrictions on clubs and licensed premises. They have no love for the tribal Irish, for Sinn Fein, and for the long-haired Communists who have brought Russia to such unspeakable grief. Conservatives will not fall into the trap which caught Mr. Chamberlain, when in his speech at Birmingham on October 13th he proposed war on labour as the future Conservative oriflamme and battle cry. We do not want to fight the men who with us fought in the trenches against the Boche. We will rather once more ask them as comrades, brothers and Englishmen, to "come over and help us"—help us to right wrong, to restore economy and sanity, and to uphold the honour of England throughout the world.

The mere fact that the Coalition has fallen and Mr. Lloyd George's autocracy ended, has already produced a magical effect abroad. The Conservative Party will return to the foreign policy which was laid down by King Edward and developed by Viscount Grey, of close friendship and cordial co-operation with France and Italy. Instead of always endeavour-

ing to "put Germany on her legs," or in other words restore a perfidious enemy and deadly competitor of British trade, the British Government will think a little more of "putting France on her legs," and enabling her to obtain the sums due to her for reparations, without which she must be ruined. Instead of humbly cringing before the bloodstained Bolsheviks and tolerating their robberies and treachery, the British Government will require the Bolshevik mission in this country to stop its propaganda expenditure of £170,000 a year or "get out," and will range itself with France and the United States in a firm policy against these Communist criminals. In the Near East, the new Government will necessarily have regard to the feelings of the King's Moslem subjects, who fought for the Allied cause in the war, and will endeavour to recover contact with the Turks, whom Englishmen have no possible interest in weakening for the interest of Soviet Russia. It is characteristic and curious that just as the news of Mr. Lloyd George's accession to office in 1916 was received with a sigh of relief from every friend of the British Empire throughout the world, so his fall in 1922 has been received with satisfaction by England's friends. The only people who regret it are the enemies of our State

—the tribal Irish, the Germans and the Bolsheviks.

The sane military policy for Conservatism was indicated by the late Sir Henry Wilson, shortly before his murder, though long before that date he had in private been impressing it upon the Coalition. It is to get rid of useless commitments in order that the Empire may be strong at the critical points on which its very existence depends. It must be strong on the tribal Irish frontier, in Egypt, and in India. The sooner it returns to the late Lord Salisbury's policy in the matter of its other commitments in the Middle and Near East, the better. Lord Salisbury was against incurring heavy liabilities in the danger zone, and strongly against any policy of playing the universal policeman. There are three commitments, specifically mentioned by Sir Henry Wilson, of which the Empire cannot lose any time in getting clear. The first is the garrisoning of Constantinople and the Straits. The second is the ridiculous attempt to set up a national home for the Jews in Palestine by coercing the Arabs. The third is the occupation of Mesopotamia and Kurdistan, where, apart from the oil district near the mouth of the Tigris, the Empire has no imaginable interest. It is far more important to be able

to defend Ulster than to protect Kurdistan ; it is much more vital to have a firm grip of the Suez Canal than to cover Palestine with armoured cars and aeroplanes.

It will be no easy task to return to sanity and economy. The doles cannot in a moment be withdrawn ; the vast education expenditure, much of which is money frittered away or exacted by the teachers with threats from the taxpayer, cannot in an hour be cut in half. The tens of thousands of superfluous officials will fight desperately for their jobs. The consequences of six years of extravagance and waste cannot be undone in a month or a year. But the first effort should be to get back without delay to Mr. Chamberlain's own "Normal Budget" which he produced in 1919, and which would allow a considerable reduction of taxation, now that the cost of living has fallen ; and at the same time the reckless extravagance of many local authorities should be curbed. There will be no room under the Conservative administration for the culpable weakness which has allowed a gang of Communists at Poplar to plunder London.

In matters of trade the necessity of obtaining funds to pay the huge indemnity to the United States (totalling some £900,000,000) will require a heavy import tax on American

manufactured goods and also on German goods. Indeed, if the balance of the exchanges is to be maintained, all imports from the United States except cotton will probably have to be severely taxed, as we cannot safely import from that country while we are attempting to repay the debt to it and while by the new prohibitive tariff it prevents British goods from being imported in payment into America. There is no other course. Our payments to the United States must relieve American taxation and cheapen the production of American goods which, if sent here, would drive from the home market British goods that have to pay, in addition to their present taxation, the amount remitted to the United States. How serious the burden on our manufactures already is, can be seen from the technical Press. On British iron the cost of manufacture has been raised since the war 28s. a ton by additional taxes, rates and charges for transport imposed. This is as though we were to levy on our trade a heavy disabling tariff, for the ruin of British workers and the benefit of the alien. It means commercial suicide.

## THE MAN WHO DIDN'T WIN THE WAR

IT was in 1908 that, according to an intimate friend, Mr. Lloyd George first began to consider the possibility of a war between England and Germany. The earlier months of that year had been remarkable for three events : a new German Navy Act, enormously increasing the German fleet, and regarded everywhere as a challenge to British sea power ; an amazing letter from the Kaiser to Lord Tweedmouth, the Liberal First Lord of the Admiralty, administering chloroform to the British Government ; and a British naval programme which was so attenuated as to excite great alarm. In the autumn Mr. Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, made a motor tour in Germany, and there in the Orangerie at Stuttgart, during a discussion of German policy, as Mr. Harold Spender tells us :

The parallel of Rome and Carthage came like a flash from Mr. Lloyd George ; it brought from him one of those far-reaching forecasts which, in other days, would have earned him the mantle of a prophet. "There is the same commercial rivalry," he said, "the same sea jealousy, the same abiding quarrel between the soldier and the merchant, the warrior and the shopkeeper, the civilization that has arrived and

the civilization that is still struggling to arrive."<sup>13</sup> He paused, and then added : " I wonder if we shall be as unprepared as Carthage ; I wonder if we shall be as torn by faction ? "<sup>14</sup>

✓ Mr. Lloyd George returned to England to find that a grave emergency had arisen. The Government had received information from a trustworthy source † that the German programme was being accelerated, and that preparations were being made to begin three German ships in advance of the anticipated time. Simultaneously it learnt that such enormous gun-making plants and such equipments of the largest lathes were being installed in the German factories, that henceforth Germany would be able to construct, arm, and complete the most powerful battleships as quickly as England. This news was all the graver because the British margin of naval superiority had been cut extraordinarily fine, so that it might be destroyed altogether, and England be defeated at sea, if Germany by any stealthy effort increased her strength. So great was the danger that the Admiralty under Mr. McKenna, who had succeeded Lord Tweedmouth, called for a programme in 1909 of eight Dreadnoughts. This would have given the British Navy only eighteen ships of Dreadnought type to thirteen German or seventeen German and Austrian (as Austria was preparing to begin building Dreadnoughts, in accordance with a secret understanding which she had reached with the German Admiralty).

\* Spender, *The Prime Minister*, pp. 348-9.

† A foreign naval authority.

After Mr. Lloyd George's talk at Stuttgart, he might have been expected to give the British Admiralty the most strenuous support. In actual fact he did nothing of the kind. He led a bitter campaign against the construction of more than four British Dreadnoughts, forgetting all about "Carthage" and "faction." His inspired organ, the *Daily News*, declared that he would resign if more than four ships were laid down. The *Nation*, another mouthpiece, "thanked God" that he was there to defend "economy and peace." But Mr. McKenna and the Admiralty were firm, and they were supported by a majority of the Cabinet. In the end a strange compromise was arranged to hocus the country and the House of Commons. The programme as voted, it is true, only contained four Dreadnoughts, but provision was made for the construction of four supplementary ships in certain conditions, which immediately arose. The Admiralty thus got eight Dreadnoughts, but no thanks to Mr. Lloyd George. This was the last large batch of ships laid down and completed before the war; had the extra four ships been delayed a year, and added to the programme of 1910, from the strain of our engineering resources which so large a programme would have caused, the whole batch would not have been ready for sea in 1914. And in that case Lord Jellicoe's fleet would have been actually weaker than the Germans in Dreadnoughts, as well as in destroyers and submarines. At one point of

the war, as he has since stated, the Grand Fleet fell to twenty-two Dreadnoughts (when, without the four extra ships, it would have numbered only eighteen), against a German effective of nineteen.\* If Mr. Lloyd George had had his way, the war might have been lost at sea before the struggle began.

During those critical years before the war it was of vital importance that the whole energy of the nation should be concentrated on its armaments, to avert disaster and maintain peace. But Mr. Lloyd George's part was to appeal to faction rather than to patriotism. His famous Budget of 1909 was floated on a sea of fabrications and false promises, and in his speech introducing it he pointedly jeered at naval preparations. He repeated these jeers in an article which he wrote for the *Nation*, declaiming against "futile armaments" and "manufactured cries of national danger." † Not one single effort to guard and protect the national life can be placed to his credit. And though, to cover himself, he afterwards professed that "there was not a man in the Cabinet who thought that war with Germany was a possibility," ‡ we have that significant passage from Mr. Spender's biography to answer this insincere excuse. As a matter of fact, most

\* *The Grand Fleet*, p. 158. Lord Jellicoe's opinion as to the qualitative superiority of the German ships to the British is well known.

† October 30, 1909.

‡ Speech, November 9, 1914.

of that Cabinet have since declared that war was "inevitable," though they one and all studiously hid the fact from the people whom they were supposed to lead.

The visit of Lord Haldane to Berlin in 1912 and the terrifying knowledge which that peer asserts that he brought back, does not seem to have affected Mr. Lloyd George's policy. He continued to oppose the annual naval programmes, even though these were now introduced by his former friend, Mr. Churchill, who had succeeded Mr. McKenna at the Admiralty. His action at the Treasury was responsible for the lack in our Army of heavy artillery, trench mortars, bombs, and other necessary equipment, the provision of which is known from Sir W. Robertson's memoirs to have been recommended by the Staff. The Navy was left without docks, submarine-proof bases, and sufficient destroyers. In 1912 a new German Navy Act had been passed, the object of which was to place the German Navy in the North Sea permanently on a war footing, instantly ready to strike; and in that same year and in 1913 vast new German Army Acts were passed which were regarded everywhere (outside the British Cabinet) as the certain prelude to war. The King of Rumania warned King Albert of Belgium in 1912, that he would be wise to make preparations for the defence of Belgium, "as the miracle of 1870, when Belgium rested intact, would not be repeated," and this warning led the Belgian Government in 1913

to take belated measures against sudden attack, which, unfortunately, could not produce fruit before the blow fell. During the winter of 1913 all the reports from Berlin pointed to the imminence of war; William II's threats and suggestions to King Albert were known to a large number of diplomatists; and the fury of the German Press at the introduction of the three years' term of military service in France—which was the French reply to the new German Army Acts—was a very grave sign. Tension in the Balkans was continuous; the Austrian Press was calling for an attack on Serbia, which was twice proposed in 1913 by Austria to the Italian Government, and twice rejected by the latter as sheer insanity.

This was the juncture seized by Mr. Lloyd George to publish on January 1, 1914, in the *Daily Chronicle*, an interview declaring that the season was "the most favourable moment for twenty years" for cutting down the British expenditure on armaments. Among other objects, this extraordinary pronouncement may have been intended to divert attention from the disagreeable Marconi business, in which Mr. Lloyd George was so directly concerned at that moment. He proceeded to argue that no reduction in the German Army must be proposed. Germany had no 60 per cent. superiority in military forces over France, whereas England postulated a 60 per cent. naval superiority over Germany. It was therefore quite natural for

Germany to spend "huge sums on the expansion of her military resources." He never alluded to the fact that Germany at that date enjoyed the alliance of Austria and Italy, whereas England had no alliance of any kind. Any further increase in the British Navy, he declared, would be "wanton provocation" to other nations. This singular deliverance coincided with a fresh campaign to cut down the British Navy Estimates and, at the same time, to eject Sir Edward Grey, the bugbear of the Pacifists, from the Foreign Office. It caused such uneasiness in Paris, where Mr. Lloyd George's instability of character was not understood, that private assurances had to be conveyed to the French Government, which was told that it was only the Chancellor of the Exchequer's private method of "vote-catching." \* With the soil of the Continent quaking, the British Government then got to work to precipitate civil war in Ireland ; and it was still at this business when the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife at Serajevo on June 28, 1914, brought Europe within sight of general war.

Violent selling of securities on the Stock Exchanges of the world by German and Austrian banks and financiers began about July 10th. No step was taken by the Cabinet or any member of it to warn the German and Austrian Governments that an attack

\* "I plead guilty to vote-catching," one of Mr. Lloyd George's *obiter dicta*.

on Serbia—who, by the admission of the Austrian official\* charged with investigating the assassination, was entirely innocent—would lead the British Government to range itself with France and Russia. There may have been plausible political reasons for refraining from giving such a warning; there were none for the course which was actually followed. The Austrian Ambassador received an “assurance” from some eminent British politician that England would in no case intervene.† Mr. Lloyd George's Press sympathizers preached neutrality in any circumstances, though, so early as July 21st, the Foreign Office was informed that, failing decided action on its part, war was certain. On the very day when the Austrian ultimatum was handed in at Belgrade, Mr. Lloyd George, with that almost uncanny gift of not foreseeing the future which he possesses, announced in the House of Commons ‡ his confident expectation of an early reduction in the expenditure on armaments—“next year there will be substantial economy without interfering in the slightest degree with the efficiency of the Navy”—and his belief in the excellence of relations between England and Germany. After the brutal terms of the ultimatum became known, he assumed the leadership of a strong party in the Cabinet which de-

\* *Austrian Red Book* (1920), i. pp. 44–5.

† Count Mensdorff is expected some day to tell us who this was.

‡ *Hansard*, July 23, 1914.

manded that England should stand aside and give Austria and Germany a free hand. He was supported by the entire Liberal Press and the whole strength of cosmopolitan finance, from Lord Rothschild downwards. "Peace at any price" was his and their cry.\*

When on July 29, 1914, Sir E. Grey did give a tardy warning to the Germans, this was neutralized by two disagreeable developments. The first was the attitude of the Liberal Press, which still declared that in no conditions would England fight. Cuttings from these newspapers were sent to the Kaiser and helped to mislead him. Two articles from the *Daily Chronicle*, which appear in the German documents, are covered with his approving comments—"aha," "bravo," "gut," "ausgezeichnet."† The second development was the despatch of an emissary from the Pacifist section of the Cabinet to inform the Germans not to attach undue importance to Sir Edward Grey's words, because he could not carry the Cabinet with him. Both the German and Austrian Governments were misled and encouraged in their mischievous policy. On July 31st, when the question of promising support to France was considered, Mr. Lloyd George assured the Cabinet that England could not afford a

\* Yet in his speech at Manchester on October 14, 1922, he had the impudence to sneer at Viscount Grey's failure to cow Germany.

† *Deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch*, 2. pp. 104-116.

war, which would mean "immediate bankruptcy" for her; that neutrality would be her most profitable course; and that, "by standing out, she would provide a rallying-point for Europe." His influence on that day secured the coldly indifferent letter which was sent by the Cabinet under the King's name in response to President Poincaré's moving appeal for support of France.

For England to stand out was precisely what Germany wanted to win the war, and no subsequent change of front on the British part would have remedied the disaster which would certainly have followed if Mr. Lloyd George had had his way. As Moltke told Conrad von Hötzendorff, the Austrian Chief of Staff, in from thirty-nine to forty days from the date of mobilization \* the German Staff expected to destroy the French Army; and, without the presence of the British Expeditionary Force, no instructed military student doubts that this plan would have been fulfilled. There would have been no force to draw off Kluck; no hope of further support from England; no possibility of holding the Channel, for the Germans meant to secure the Channel ports. For the second time in less than six years, Mr. Lloyd George all but lost the war before it had been begun. On August 1, 1914, when Germany had declared war on Russia, we have Mr. Lloyd George's own word for stating what his attitude was:

\* Novak, *Weg zur Katastrophe*, p. 54.

A poll of the electors of Great Britain would have shown 95 per cent. against embroiling this country in hostilities. Powerful City financiers, whom it was my duty to interview this Saturday on the financial situation, ended the conference with an earnest hope that Britain would keep out of it. . . . If Germany had been wise she would not have set foot on Belgian soil. The Liberal Government then would not have intervened.\*

It is odd, but another indication of the instability of Mr. Lloyd George's character, that, with marvellous oblivion of the part which he had played on this occasion, he subsequently declared on August 7, 1918, in the House of Commons, that there was an "obligation of honour" to go to France's aid. But that obligation in the critical hours of 1914 he completely ignored.

Even on the following day, he was still active for forgetting the obligation, though it was then known that the Germans had violated the neutrality of Luxemburg and were about to violate the neutrality of Belgium. This, his Press organs were declaring, was a trifling matter, because "no student of the probable course of war in Europe under modern conditions has ever disguised from himself that Germany, if she were at war with France, would snatch the advantage of a traverse of Belgian territory."† The enthusiasm which he afterwards professed to feel for the policy of coming forward to beat off a treacherous attack, "on a small and

\* *Pearson's Magazine*, March 1915.

† *Westminster Gazette*, August 3, 1914.

unprotected country which has done her [Germany] no wrong,"\* was not manifest during the Cabinet discussions of Sunday, August 2nd, when Ministers were debating their attitude in view of a possible violation of Belgian neutrality. He is said to have produced a map and to have endeavoured to attenuate such an act of German aggression as a mere trifle. Whether this is true or not we shall not know until the secrets of 1914 are told, but it is in general accord with other facts that are definitely ascertained. What is quite certain is that a remarkable transformation took place when Mr. Asquith, later that day, received from Mr. Bonar Law a pledge of Unionist support, and learned with it that, if the Pacifist section of the Cabinet, headed by Mr. Lloyd George, declared against intervention, he would now be able to get rid of them and form a Coalition Cabinet. Many who know best what took place believe that from this hour dated Mr. Lloyd George's zeal for war and for the defeat of Germany. It was fortunate, indeed, for his country that, during the six previous years, when Mr. Lloyd George, as he afterwards casually announced, had "really thought that at last the era of peace and goodwill had dawned," some few close observers had persistently warned the British people that Germany was (in his own subsequent words) "forging and hiding up immense accumulations of war stores to take her neighbours

\* *Pearson's Magazine*, March 1915

unawares and murder them in their sleep." \* It was due to these people, not to him, that the Navy was sufficiently strong to prevent disaster, and that the Army was able to give modest, but invaluable, aid at the outset to France. Lord Roberts, Lord Northcliffe, the Editor and Proprietor of the *Morning Post*, a few other journalists, and a handful of "anti-German cranks" had saved the British people from being "murdered in their sleep"—a sleep induced by Mr. Lloyd George's soporifics.

The great test had come, and we reach the actual performances of Mr. Lloyd George in the war. He was now following Mr. Pickwick's advice, and shouting with the largest crowd—a practice for which perhaps no modern demagogue can be too severely censured, but he took his usual precautions in case there might be a sudden change in feeling by maintaining an ostentatious friendship with Mr. Ramsay Macdonald.† This gentleman's record was damnable, and no Socialist gave the German propaganda greater aid in his writings and speeches than he, yet Mr. Lloyd George publicly declared him to be "one of my greatest personal friends." As some offset to this compromising affection for a notorious defeatist, Mr. Lloyd George's measures on the financial side were bold and excellent,

\* Speech, June 23, 1915.

† To have a foot in both camps has always been his strategy, as was seen when he was dealing with De Valera and the Russian Bolsheviks.

and prevented that catastrophe in the City which he and his friends had foretold, and which the Germans had done so much to prepare. But any Chancellor of the Exchequer would have taken these steps ; he only followed the advice of the best City opinion, though he deserves all possible credit for this.

The first great development with which his name is associated, apart from purely financial measures, is the munitions campaign, for the initiation of which his friends have attributed to him the entire honour. The fact is that so early as October 1914 he became a member of a committee to advise the War Office as to the best method of providing guns and ammunition. For several months there were no signs of any special activity on his part, though on February 28, 1915, in a speech at Bangor he stated that, "we are conducting a war as if there were no war. . . . This is an engineers' war, and it will be won or lost owing to the shortcomings of engineers." But the speech was otherwise an attack on "the lure of the drink"—a topic which exercised the same fascination on Mr. Lloyd George as King Charles's head on Mr. Dick. It was not organization or drastic change in the type of shell produced that was required, but prohibition. "The drink," said Mr. Lloyd George, "is doing us more harm than all the German submarines put together." Most of this was nonsense, and the charge that the British working man was a habitual

drunkard was grossly untrue, and did great harm. One of the reasons why the output of munitions was low was the censorship which, as the Liberal Government worked it, was only allowed to pass matter representing everything in the rosiest hues. On March 17th, Mr. Lloyd George was again talking nonsense to the Trade Union representatives regarding the dilution of labour: "We are fighting Germany and Austria and drink, and the greatest of these three deadly foes is drink." These statements he afterwards endeavoured to justify by issuing a White Paper giving figures as to the effects of "the drink" and bad time-keeping in munition works, which were regarded by working-class representatives as unfair. On April 21, 1915, Mr. Lloyd George made a somewhat complacent speech, telling the House of Commons that the output of high explosive had been placed on a footing "which relieved us of all anxiety," and that in shell output "wonderful things" had been done.

His awakening only came when the Northcliffe Press began to thunder. Early in March, 1915, Mr. George Moore, an intimate friend of Lord French's, brought to that Press (according to an American correspondent, Mr. W. G. Shepherd) information as to the dangerous situation at the front from want of high explosive shells and heavy guns. Lord French himself appealed to the newspaper proprietors to act in concert and secure a change, but without effect; only Lord Northcliffe was ready

to move. On March 22, 1915, Lord French, in a published interview, declared that the problem of the war was "munitions, more munitions, always more munitions," which was followed by leading articles in *The Times* from March 25, 1915, onwards. As yet neither the Government nor Mr. Lloyd George took any determined steps to meet the demand, and not until Lord French once more directly intervened, by passing a message from Colonel Repington to *The Times*, which revealed the want of high explosive shell as the cause of the failure at Festubert in mid-May, and by sending the facts to Lord Northcliffe and the Unionist leaders, did Mr. Lloyd George "get a move on," and notify Mr. Asquith that he could not continue to hold office unless a change was made. The result was the formation of the Coalition Cabinet of 1915, while Mr. Lloyd George became Minister of Munitions, and organized the output of munitions on a gigantic scale with no one to obstruct or harass him. But he never explained that, down to the opening of the battle of the Somme, the munitions expended in the field had been ordered before his advent. He deserves all honour for what he did, but he acted only when public pressure was applied, and, as Sir C. E. Callwell\* has said, with a full knowledge of the truth, his speeches in mid-1915 "left an uncommonly nasty taste in the mouth," because he assumed the credit that belonged to others. Nor was

\* *Experiences of a Dug-out*, p. 197.

there anything done here which was not done with equal efficiency in France and Germany ; and in France and Germany long before our British demagogues had bestirred themselves.

How far Mr. Lloyd George was responsible for the series of surrenders to intimidation by strikers in the munitions department, which began with his famous "settlement" of July 1915, in the case of the Welsh miners, is not yet known. This might have been ascribed to the general flabbiness and feebleness which characterized Mr. Asquith's administration, did we not remember that the same policy of surrender marked Mr. Lloyd George throughout when he became Prime Minister. As was said by the *Morning Post*, his dread of Labour, after he had enraged it by accusing it, not very fairly, of drunkenness, was extraordinary ; and his attitude to it was always that of a man handing a bun at the end of an umbrella to a bear—it had to be bribed, cozened, petted, and placated. This "settlement" made waste paper of his Munitions Act, and, like all his subsequent "settlements," settled nothing at all ; while the practice of extorting money from the taxpayer by threats was encouraged and the cost of munitions enormously increased through his capitulation.

As for the introduction of compulsory service, Mr. Lloyd George is stated by his friends to have strongly supported it in the Cabinet, but the whole campaign for it was

conducted by the Press, and again Lord Northcliffe and the *Morning Post* played the leading part. When the battle was clearly won, Mr. Lloyd George gave Mr. Asquith to understand that he would resign if compulsion was not enforced, but by then even the *Daily News* had reached the conclusion that in a general election "the compulsionists will carry the country" \* and, when the General Compulsion Act was passed in May 1916, as the *Annual Register* for that year states, "few Bills of such vital importance had ever passed through Parliament with less opposition, or with more universal consent." There was here, then, no facing of unpopularity in the national cause for Mr. Lloyd George. The pioneer work had been done for him by others.

Early in the war Mr. Lloyd George reached the conclusion that the Germans could not be beaten in the West, and that there a condition of stalemate existed. It was, perhaps, a natural deduction by one who knew nothing of the history of war and very little of current military science, that some easier way of winning the conflict than by Lord Haig's policy of killing Germans and gradually crushing their power of resistance must exist and could be found.† It induced him, so

\* January 6, 1916.

† Compare Grant's policy in 1864. "The underlying idea was the continuous and concurrent employment of the maximum of force against the Confederacy—continual battle, continual slaughter, till the will of his adversary was broken. He saw clearly that no manœuvring and no capture of positions could end the war."—*Cambridge History*, 7, pp. 514-5.

early as January 1915, to advocate, in common with M. Briand, an Allied expedition to Salonica, and began the era of "side shows"; and it led him subsequently to intervene repeatedly and sometimes with the most unfortunate result, in matters of strategy. The difficulty was that there was neither the man-power nor the supply of munitions necessary for a great expedition to Salonica in the early months of 1915; that the attitude of Constantine of Greece was dubious, and without his support little could be done; and that the tonnage required for the despatch to the Balkans and maintenance there of any considerable force was enormous; while the communications were deplorably bad, and British troops had no experience in mountain fighting. Investigations showed that some 280 ships would occupy five months in moving ten divisions (200,000 men) to Salonica. The climate was pestiferous, and, when a British force was sent, on the average every other man in it was on the sick list. Moreover, the Germans had the interior and shorter lines; that is to say, while we were moving ten men, they could move fifteen, and move them faster if they chose. These were the reasons which swayed the military opposition to this campaign, though a movement to Salonica would probably have been less mischievous than the Gallipoli "gamble" that was forced on the Army by political influence, in which Mr. Lloyd George seems to have had no share. The Gallipoli expedition was

eventually withdrawn, largely as the result of efforts on the part of the Australian Government and Lord Northcliffe, aided by Lord Carson, but the policy of scattering the British forces in many fields was maintained and developed. The Press censorship prevented any effective criticism, and this dissipation of strength was concealed from the nation, which knew little of it, and was staggered when the figures were published at the close of the war, showing the enormous number of men (3,098,000) that had been employed outside France, where alone the war could be won.

Even after a very considerable force, with a ration strength of 600,000, had assembled at Salonica in 1916, the Allies, owing to the attitude of Greece and the peril of a treacherous attack on their rear, could do little to aid Rumania ; and it may generally be said that this diversion took two Allied soldiers to neutralize one on the side of the Germanic Powers, while the strength of the Bulgarian positions was such that they could not be successfully attacked until Bulgarian *moral* had given way. Because of these distant expeditions, a fresh recruiting crisis arose late in 1916, after the battle of the Somme, which, as we now know from abundant German sources, all but brought the collapse of Germany, and did in actual fact destroy the best part of the trained German Army. The British losses were terrific, though they were not heavier than the German losses ; but

they frightened British politicians, who imagined that a desperate struggle with a determined, perfectly prepared and ruthless enemy could be won without fearful sacrifices.

Mr. Asquith's conduct of the war had been so feeble and half-hearted, that towards the close of 1916 his administration was tottering. His attempt to direct operations with a "sanhedrin" of twenty-three or twenty-four politicians, most of them lawyers, and rumours that he was not unfavourably disposed to talk of "mediation" (which meant a disastrous peace), alarmed the House of Commons and the country. The public saw in Mr. Lloyd George a ruthless critic of the administration, and hoped that if he was given power he might prove the veritable organizer of victory. That was the history of the crisis of December 1916. As usual, Mr. Lloyd George ran with the Asquith hare and hunted with the Northcliffe hounds. He made certain demands of Mr. Asquith, among which was the formation of a small War Council, threatening his own resignation if they were not granted. But when Mr. Asquith showed a bold front he drew back, and was only compelled to act by an outspoken article in *The Times*, which produced the explosion. Perhaps to his own surprise he found himself in the position of a virtual dictator, with supreme power—pressed, entreated, and exhorted by the nation to make any and every demand on it that might achieve victory.

About the date of his administration many

of the gravest difficulties had been overcome. Compulsion had been introduced without catastrophic results ; he had only to apply it. A great army had been created, and provided with abundance of munitions ; he had only to maintain it. The entry of the United States into the war early in 1917, after the ruthless submarine war began, had given the Allies enormous reserves of men and the support of an unexhausted people. It had also removed all difficulties as to the blockade. The German position, by Ludendorff's admissions, was desperate—though this was not fully known in England at the time—and it was only saved by the collapse of Russia, which had long been impending. But with great uneasiness and no little surprise, Englishmen who had looked to Mr. Lloyd George for the extremest vigour, found that when he had obtained the fullest responsibility, his administration was almost as hesitating and feeble as that of Mr. Asquith. Throughout 1917 he shirked the recruiting question, in the face of constant warnings from his military advisers, and though there were known to be 3,500,000 men of military age in non-essential trades. Believing the direction of the Navy to be weak and lacking in the energy needed to crush the submarines, he delayed to make decisive changes in the Admiralty personnel. At Salonica he hesitated for six months before clearing out King Constantine, who was a constant source of anxiety to the Allies. In France, he never

concealed his disbelief in Lord Haig's strategy, and, but for the support of Lord Northcliffe, Lord Haig might have been replaced after the famous interview of February 1917, in which he roused Mr. Lloyd George's ire by confidently predicting the Allied victory that year. On that occasion the Northcliffe Press had to sound the "hands off the Army" to the Prime Minister.

At home, he was confronted with Labour troubles, due to a small gang of revolutionaries, who were well known. The whole country was anxious that they should be laid by the heels. But at Barrow, at Glasgow, and in the aircraft factories they were allowed to do what they liked, and the Cabinet had not the pluck to arrest them. It struck at the little people instead, exactly as it afterwards acted in the case of Sinn Fein. On every occasion Mr. Lloyd George pleaded Labour troubles as his excuse for his feebleness in dealing with the man-power problem.

One of the results of his distrust of Lord Haig was his subordination of the British Army and Commander-in-Chief in France to General Nivelle in the spring of 1917. This had unhappy consequences. Nivelle, unlike Foch, had not the entire confidence of the British command; and his own subordinates in the French Army doubted his competence. His great offensive was a most unfortunate failure, and because the British plans had to be rearranged to suit it, they, too, were upset. Time was lost, and Lord Haig was not able

to transfer his attack to Flanders before the best months of the year had passed. There were signs of the complaint known as "cold feet" in the Cabinet. It is known from Mr. Henderson's statements \* that Mr. Lloyd George favoured sending an envoy to the Stockholm Conference of extreme Socialists in the summer of 1917, which represented a German intrigue, supported by the defeatists in most of the Allied countries; and that he only drew back at the last moment. A British "peace-feeler" was addressed through the Vatican to Germany in August 1917. Mr. Lloyd George was in fact showing that very weakness of which Mr. Asquith had been suspected, and this after the United States had come whole-heartedly into the war.

The problem towards the close of 1917 was how the Allies were to hold the front in France against the whole German strength until the Americans arrived in force. Mr. Lloyd George, firmly convinced of the stalemate theory—that it was impossible for either side to break through the other's defences—had conceived a remarkable plan. It was to ship six British divisions to Alexandretta, on the Syrian coast, during the winter of 1917-18, and after defeating and knocking out the Turks, to bring them back to France for the spring. The movement of these 125,000 men would have occupied months, and demanded a million tons of shipping, which would have to be sent through the

\* Speech, November 27, 1918.

Mediterranean,\* then rendered thoroughly insecure by the U-boat operations, and this at a time when difficulty was experienced in victualling and supplying the enormous force at Salonica. Far from sending six divisions away from France, the British Staff were most anxious that the bulk of the British infantry in Palestine should be transferred to the Western front, there to meet the impending attack, but this Mr. Lloyd George impatiently refused. Another plan, which was also Mr. Lloyd George's—to transfer a large force to Italy and deal a fatal blow at Austria—was defeated, according to M. Painlevé,† by the criticism of the Italians themselves, who calculated that the season would be too far advanced for success before the troops could be ready to operate.

The main fact is that Mr. Lloyd George, after all his fiery denunciations of the Asquith policy, on the eve of the great German offensive in France took no steps to meet the coming storm, other than to renew the stealthy peace negotiations in Switzerland, through General Smuts, who went to that neutral country, under an *alias*, and there held conversation with Count Mensdorff. For, as the hour for the attack approached, though the Cabinet publicly professed to disbelieve in its possibility, the colder grew their "cold feet." The British Army, having to guard so many vulnerable points, was so weak on

\* Callwell, *Experiences of a Dug-out*, pp. 184-5.

† *Revue de Paris*, February 15, 1922.

the St. Quentin sector, which the Germans had chosen, that the enemy was able to concentrate three men to our one. And yet there were at home, or in other fields, no fewer than 750,000 British troops available, who were poured into France after the catastrophe had happened. Sent there in time, they could, and would, probably have inflicted on the Germans a disastrous and crushing defeat. The war would have been won without American aid. That it was not so won was principally due to Mr. Lloyd George's mistake in insisting that the Western front on either side was impenetrable.

When the disaster came, none of these terrible Labour troubles happened which he had professed to foresee when he was urged to guard against it. The nation and the Empire uttered never a whimper, and the troops in France fought with a spirit which put our mandarins to shame. The selection of Foch for the supreme Allied command has been claimed by the Prime Minister's propagandists as his special achievement. As we now know, it was the result of a general agreement; Lord Haig had long been for it, and had asked for it; and Foch was Clemenceau's man. What was most curious—though it is not generally known—is that when the tide turned, Mr. Lloyd George continued to put out peace "feelers." There was the strange invitation to Mr. Coleyn, of Holland, in early May 1918, which Admiral Sir Reginald Hall, then Director of Naval

Intelligence, managed to sidetrack so cleverly. There was the mysterious Glasgow speech by General Smuts on May 17, 1918, which alarmed the public. There was another inexplicable intrigue in June which brought Lord Northcliffe into rather violent action. To this Ludendorff refers in his latest book.\* When Lord Haig opened the Hundred Days' battle with the greatest success which down to that date had been gained by the Allies in the West, breaking deep into the German front, Mr. Lloyd George was still incredulous. Lord Haig's continued advance and his storming of the Drocourt-Quéant line — a military feat of the very first importance — brought no congratulation from the Cabinet. On the eve of the hardest and most decisive battle of the whole war, the assault on the Canal du Nord and the main Hindenburg line, the British War Cabinet, far from encouraging its Commander-in-Chief and his magnificent troops, was full only of alarm and disquietude, and wanted him to delay his onslaught till 1919. Not until after this victory, which was perhaps the most wonderful on the Allied side of the whole struggle, were the British troops in France publicly thanked by the Cabinet for which they had won the war.

When the Germans were visibly held and worsted in France, then, as the British Staff had always predicted, all the German allies

\* *Kriegführung*, p. 218. "England began to talk at the Hague with the Germans about peace."

began to drop away. Bulgaria was the first to desert; after the Allied victories of July, August, and early September in France, the Bulgarian troops and Government lost heart; and positions of extraordinary strength were broken through by Franchet d'Espérey's divisions. Turkey was defeated and detached by Lord Allenby's fine generalship, almost entirely with the aid of Australian cavalry and Indian troops. The Indian forces were forthcoming as the result of the reorganization of the Indian Army, which had been begun by that most competent and clear-headed of soldiers, Sir Charles Monro, under Mr. Asquith's administration; and with this Mr. Lloyd George had very little to do.

Thus, on the political and military side in his conduct of the war, Mr. Lloyd George proved himself no Abraham Lincoln. He made all the obvious mistakes; he was largely responsible for the defeat of Gough's army in the German offensive of 1918; he failed to handle the recruiting question firmly; he surrendered to the most extravagant Labour demands and gave the Smillies and Ramsay MacDonalds a free hand; and his peace intrigues caused profound uneasiness, and, but for Lord Northcliffe's determined action, might have brought disaster. He proved himself, in fact, what he is by nature, a typical politician with a very marked touch of "the quitter" in his character, extremely ignorant, though quick, eloquent, artful, and endowed with a personal magnetism, which gives him

great power and veils his irresolution and instability of temperament.

If he is the man who did not win the war, but allowed the British people and the British armies to win it, there can be very little doubt that he will go down to posterity as "the man who lost the peace." To him our country owes it that, while Germany has so far evaded making any adequate reparation payments, the British nation is crushed with taxes seven times as heavy per head as those of the German Empire; that the United Kingdom has been disintegrated; that the foundations of British rule in India have been undermined; and that our most trusted Ally, France, has been estranged, while Germany continues defiant. All that is beyond question his work.

## THE MAN WHO LOST THE PEACE

THREE and a half years \* have passed since the Armistice under the dictatorship of Mr. Lloyd George, and it is now possible to measure some of the results of his rule. In November 1918 the British Empire stood on the very pinnacle of glory. At sea, on land, and in the air its forces were unsurpassed in their strength and achievements. In Europe, it had sure and loyal allies, if President Wilson's Government watched it with some jealousy and with the determination to weaken it in every possible way at the coming peace. Undoubtedly, there were danger points due mainly to the action or inaction of the dictator in power. There was the Sinn Fein movement in Ireland which he had professed to ignore and had thus left to gather strength. There was the enormous cost of administration for which he was in large measure to blame by the prodigal example he set in the Ministry of Munitions. There was the Communist conspiracy which he had denounced in speeches, while pandering to it in action, and which he had permitted to fix wages in every industry

\* This article appeared in May, 1922.

far above the figure that was earned. There was, lastly, the impoverishment of the United Kingdom, exhausted by more than four years of stupendous effort, suffering and sacrifice, in which almost every lintel (outside Southern Ireland) had been smitten with blood, and the savings of a century spent. But there was nothing lost that could not have been made good by firm and faithful government, to which the nation would have eagerly responded.

Through these three and a half years Mr. Lloyd George has been autocrat. The three great checks on autocracy in this country—Cabinet control, Parliamentary opposition, and Press criticism—have been suspended. As the Montagu affair proved with its disclosures, Cabinet government has disappeared. Mr. Lloyd George's Ministers are mere subordinates with no soul to call their own, who will throw overboard any principle at his orders, as has been seen in their acceptance of his Irish policy, of his Bolshevik policy, and of his financial policy. In the House of Commons there is no control of any kind on his caprices. He is faced, as the *Morning Post* has truly said, not with opposition, but with incitement. As for the Press, he has discovered the means of converting the greater part of it from an instrument for watchful criticism on the nation's behalf into a mere machine for propaganda, by the administration or promise of titles to its proprietors. Whatever, then, has been lost since the war has been lost

only through himself. He, and no other, is the artisan of ruin.

After the Armistice, there were four great aims to be secured in the peace negotiations. They were payment by the German nation which had made the war and inflicted all this misery and bloodshed on mankind ; trial of the ex-Kaiser for the policy of terrorism and outrage adopted with his express and avowed sanction by the German armies ; punishment of the leading German war-criminals for their infraction of the recognized laws of war ; and security against a repetition of German aggression in the near future. This, again, involved the thorough disarmament of Germany or the enforcement of such conditions as would protect France against another attack. A fifth matter of scarcely less vital interest was the reconstitution of Russia and her liberation from the Bolshevik régime, without which there could be no enduring peace in Europe.

At the General Election of December 1918, on the eve of the Paris Conference, Mr. Lloyd George obtained an immense majority by denunciations of Bolshevism and the Labour programme, and on the faith of definite pledges with regard to the peace. On November 28, 1918, he declared :

When Germany defeated France, she made France pay. That is the principle which she herself established. There is absolutely no doubt about the principle, and that is the principle we should proceed upon—that Germany must pay the costs of the war up to the limit of her capacity to do so.

This was rightly regarded as unsatisfactory, and the Northcliffe Press\* at once urged the electors to require something more definite. It roused such a storm that a few days later on the eve of the polls, Mr. Lloyd George amended his promise and made it run thus: "We propose to demand the whole cost of the war from Germany . . . we shall search their pockets for it." In the "Six Points" of his programme on December 10, he pledged himself to obtain "fullest indemnities from Germany," "trial of the Kaiser" and "punishment of those responsible for atrocities."

Disclosures since the Armistice have revealed the fact that the pledge to "make Germany pay" was given in circumstances of singular duplicity. Mr. Baruch, one of President Wilson's financial advisers, has pointed out that Mr. Lloyd George had already privately agreed to President Wilson's demand, that only "reparation for damage," and not "the costs of the war," should be collected from the Germans. The Prime Minister withheld this important fact from the electorate, which would have voted quite otherwise, had it known. No sooner had he arrived in Paris and had the peace negotiations begun, than ugly rumours began to circulate as to his intentions on two vital points, the German payments and the treatment of the Bolsheviks.

\* The *Daily Mail* and *The Times* were then under Lord Northcliffe's control. From 1909 to his death this year they, with various other newspapers in the same group, were known as "the Northcliffe Press."

viks. The claim for "fullest indemnities" was pressed by France, Italy, Japan and Serbia, and by Mr. Hughes, the Australian Premier. It obtained no support from Mr. Lloyd George, who suddenly discovered that, if Germany were called upon to pay for all the loss and suffering which she had deliberately caused, she would be thrown "into the arms of the Bolsheviks." So early as January 1919 he conceived the idea of summoning Bolshevik delegates to Paris, thus implicitly recognizing the Bolshevik régime; and with President Wilson he despatched a secret emissary in the person of an American, Mr. Bullitt, "to make a proposal to the Soviet Government" for its participation in the peace. On March 25, 1919, he prepared a remarkable Memorandum, which was published in March, 1922, and which was in effect a plea for letting Germany off and coming to terms with Lenin. About that same date he had various conversations with the Paris correspondent of the *Westminster Gazette*, which were summed up in an article published by that journal on March 31, 1919, without mentioning his name, but leaving not the slightest doubt as to the source whence the information came.

The attitude revealed in this article was such as to cause consternation. Lord Northcliffe, who was then in Paris and knew all the facts, thereupon sent his warning telegram to the late Mr. Kennedy Jones, with the result that 370 M.P.'s, including practically the whole Conservative party, intimated to Mr. Lloyd George that he would lose their

support if the *Westminster Gazette* interview—which is now shown to have been almost identical in terms with his Memorandum of March 25, 1919, represented his programme. He hurried back to London, and on April 16, 1919, calmly repudiated the interview, and insisted on his own good faith. He even denied his intrigues with the Bolsheviks, mentioning Mr. Bullitt with scorn as “a young American gentleman,” and declaring that “we have made no approach of any kind.” The only excuse he has since been able to offer for his statements on that occasion is that the *Westminster Gazette* article did not mention his determination to demand the cost of pensions from the Germans.

As the result of his anxiety to protect the German rather than the British taxpayer, the payments to be made by Germany were whittled down in the Treaty; and Mr. Lloyd George himself in his speech to the German delegation on March 3, 1921, showed how he had broken his pledge:

We are not asking for the costs of the war. Not a penny. Not a penny. . . . We are each of us [Allied Powers] groaning under a load of taxation to pay debts which each of us incurred to defend ourselves in this war, and to place the whole of them upon one country we fully recognize would be an impossible proceeding.

But this was what he had definitely promised to do. He went on :

We have therefore deliberately, in the Treaty of Versailles, not asked Germany to pay one single paper mark for the

cost incurred by the Allied countries in defending themselves in this war.

Even those halting and unsatisfactory terms were further whittled down by his efforts in a long series of subsequent conferences, in which he appeared to be fighting for German interests. Up to date, practically nothing has been paid by Germany for reparations. France and Belgium have been left to make good the damage done to them as best they could. Even the expenses of the Allied armies of occupation on the Rhine have been barely covered. There may, indeed, be a heavy deficit now that the United States has claimed £50,000,000 for the cost of its quota in those armies. As the price of letting Germany off England and France are threatened with financial catastrophe, while Germany looks on and laughs. *Germany in depression!*

That England and France should be ruined to make a German holiday seems an odd kind of justice. Yet this is one of the first results of the peace for which Mr. Lloyd George is so largely responsible. In the reparation terms is a provision that German taxation shall be "fully as heavy proportionately" as that of any of the Allied Powers. It has not been enforced. At the present date, by an official return, taxation in this country is £22 per head, while in Germany it is under £1 per head. The British standard rate of income tax stands at five shillings in the pound. Dr. Shaw, an impartial American

authority, calculates that the Englishman is three times as heavily taxed as the German, having regard to taxable capacity. The evidence of such American inquirers as Bishop Cannon and Mr. Kaufman on German conditions is that Germany is deliberately evading payment, even of the comparatively small amount which the Treaty required her to find. General Booth, who has recently visited Germany, has reported that he found there far less poverty and destitution than here, and far more evidence of prosperity. There is, admittedly, no unemployment whatever in Germany. As British industries are saddled with taxation of nearly £1,000,000,000 a year, against a German taxation of under £100,000,000, and as taxes are a direct charge on production, our goods are too dear to be sold in the world markets. Our trade has sustained a deadly blow, because it is being required to pay the charges which should have fallen on the Germans, and because one of our best customers, France, has been so impoverished by Germany's default that she cannot buy. Meantime, £5,000,000 in gold is being remitted by the Prussian Government to the ex-Kaiser, and over £1,000,000,000 of German money has been placed in investments abroad, to evade the Allies, with the secret complicity of the German Government. During the war British subjects were required to surrender their valuable foreign securities for the use of their Government. No such action has

been taken by the German Republic against the German holders of foreign investments, and the German Government has just refused to comply with the Reparation Commission's mild demand that it should move in this matter.

As for the ex-Kaiser, the Treaty contained an article for his trial, which was pure "eyewash," and the Allies promised to "address a request to the Government of the Netherlands" for his surrender. Two gentle little Notes were sent on January 15 and March 29, 1920, to which the Dutch Government returned a peremptory refusal. It has always been suspected that, with the Notes, an intimation was conveyed that the surrender of William II was not really desired. What is certain is that if the Allies had been in earnest they could very quickly have brought the Dutch Government to heel. The British people was tricked once more. Yet there was definite proof of William II's direct responsibility for the appalling outrages committed by the German Army, in his letter of August 1914 to Francis Joseph, which was captured by the French secret service in 1918 :

My soul is torn, but everything must be put to fire and sword ; men, women, children and old men must be slaughtered ; and not a tree or house be left standing. With these methods of terrorism, which alone are capable of affecting a people as degenerate as the French, the war will be over in two months, whereas if I admit humanitarian considerations, it will last years. In spite of my repugnance I have therefore been obliged to recommend the former system.

The sorry farce of the Leipzig trials has made short work of Mr. Lloyd George's promises to punish the war-criminals. The two worst of the men tried, Lieutenants Dithmar and Boldt, responsible for the fiendish crime of sinking the hospital ship *Llandovery Castle* and murdering as many of the survivors in the boats as they could, were sentenced to only four years' imprisonment, and allowed to escape almost immediately after their sentence had been pronounced. They are still at large. Not one single person of prominence has been tried. Yet sympathy with savage and unrepentant malefactors is no noble trait. The German war-crimes, which included mutilation and torture, have been committed with almost complete impunity.

As for security against any renewal of the war, that has not been attained. The French Staff were profoundly sceptical—and with good reason—as to the practicability of disarming Germany. For military reasons which were stated by Marshal Foch, they desired permanent military control of the territory west of the Rhine. Mr. Lloyd George fought against this on the assumption that the cession of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 had brought the war of 1914, and that so the separation of the Rhine provinces from Germany would bring a new war of revenge in the future. But it is a psychological fact that revenge (except in novels and plays) is a very minor factor in human action: and it is a historical fact that the war of 1914 was declared by

the victorious aggressor on the defeated nation of 1871, so that the Alsace question had little to do with it. The disarmament of Germany was forced upon France as the alternative to the Rhine frontier ; but so completely did she disbelieve in its effectiveness that she required, as the price of abandoning her Rhine proposal, a guarantee from England and the United States against any future unprovoked attack by Germany. The guarantee was given in the so-called Triple Pact of June 28, 1919. So far as concerns the United States, the Senate repudiated the guarantee shortly afterwards and left France in the lurch. Thereupon Mr. Lloyd George insisted that the British treaty also fell through, as it was conditional upon American support. Thus France has surrendered peace conditions vital for her safety in exchange for goods which have not been delivered to her. She is left face to face with a formidable and revengeful enemy, exposed to risks so terrible that she cannot disarm. And yet people wonder that she is indignant at finding herself thus "jockeyed," and in the same breath denounced for "imperialism" by the very people who have "jockeyed" her !

Second only in importance to support of France, if a long peace was to be secured, was support of Poland. The existence of a strong Slav State to the east of Germany is proved by history to have been necessary for the control of the German ambition to dominate the world. With the ruin and disruption of

Russia by the Bolsheviks, who were sent to Russia by Germany, and at the outset supplied with German money for their treason, Poland was the only State which could supply the necessary counterpoise in the East. For once, Mr. Wilson was in agreement with M. Clemenceau in desiring a strong Poland with access to the sea. It is sad to have to state that the bitter and invariable antagonist of the Poles was Mr. Lloyd George. He detached from Poland her historic port of Danzig. He deprived her of the Marienwerder district of West Prussia, through which runs the main railway from Warsaw to Danzig. He forced on the Allies the plebiscite for Upper Silesia which deprived her of most of a province that has a preponderance of Poles in its population. If he had fought for British interests at Paris with the energy which he put forth against the Poles, the record of the peace negotiations might have been much more fortunate. Even after the peace he continued his attitude of animosity to Poland. In her desperate fight against the Bolsheviks in 1920, he allowed her to be hampered by the obstruction of a British official at Danzig to the transport of arms and ammunition through what was professedly a free port, placed at her service. This hostility to her, on his own admission, was dictated by the threats of the Labour Party in this country, which was notoriously swayed by German and Bolshevik propaganda.

Thus at Paris the words of Marshal Foch

to the politicians were justified, *Vous avez saboté notre victoire.* As for German disarmament, if Germany had been made to pay, there would have been little money left for the stealthy armaments which are now proceeding in the Fatherland. To prevent them, constant pressure by the Allies is necessary, and that pressure is not forthcoming owing to the inaction and ill-will of Mr. Lloyd George. Here, as in Ireland in 1917-20, he is playing the ostrich game and refusing to see evident facts. It is calculated by the French authority, Colonel Reboul, that no fewer than 4,500,000 rifles and 30,000 machine guns are still in the hands of the German authorities. Though by the Treaty Germany is allowed only 84 heavy howitzers, between November 15 and December 23, 1921, no fewer than 600 10-in. howitzers, made since the Armistice, were actually discovered at one single arsenal in Saxony. Orders were detected proving the direct complicity of the German Government in their manufacture and concealment. In a brewery at Frankfort 400 aeroplane engines of the latest pattern were found. In an "old-metal" yard, a Zeppelin intact, though deflated, was discovered. Secret depots of arms have been unearthed in almost every province of Germany. The returns of the German armament works, which were to be surrendered under the Treaty, were declared by the German authorities to have been "lost"; were found hidden on a sudden visit of the Allied commissioners

to Spandau arsenal ; and had again disappeared when the Allies returned to claim them. As for the German armed forces, these are being maintained on a vast scale under a variety of camouflages. There is a large armed police, with mine-throwers, flame-projectors, gas-masks, and machine guns, which is alleged to be needed as a protection against the Bolsheviks. When the Allies protested it was "abolished" by the singular expedient of changing its name. The Sicherheitspolizei vanished and the Schutzpolizei took its place. While the British Government has no money for aircraft, a large German air force exists, camouflaged as "civil aviation," with airships and with all the plant and plans for building with great speed all-metal aeroplanes of the most powerful type. A few hours' work would transform these machines into the most formidable bombers, equipped with gas-bombs, which the intact German chemical works can at any moment turn out on any scale. Even the submarine clauses of the Treaty are believed to have been evaded. Definite information is lacking, but the French experts state that engines for submarines and parts of submarines are still being made in Germany. A new fleet of U-boats could be assembled with great speed if this French evidence is correct ; and England to-day has no immense anti-submarine organization to meet a new attack.

The repercussion of these disastrous peace terms upon home affairs has been far-reaching. Mr. Lloyd George made the most lavish

promises at the general election on the faith of the sums which he was going to extract from the Germans for the cost of the war. "The new world" and "homes for heroes" were among the items. He had not the courage, when he returned with nothing, to admit that these promises could not be fulfilled. He did not warn the public that there was henceforth only one way to the "new world"—by hard work and loyal co-operation between all classes in facing hardship and poverty. On the contrary, he acted as though the nation had suddenly come into vast wealth. After the Napoleonic wars this country had the signal advantage of a highly developed industrial system, which no other country then possessed. But it could never have recovered had not its Government reduced taxation and practised the strictest economy. The tax-revenue was lowered from £71,000,000 in 1814 to £52,000,000 in 1817, or by about 30 per cent. Entirely different was the action of Mr. Lloyd George. He raised the tax-revenue from £837,000,000 in the last year of the war to the appalling figure of £1,058,000,000 in a series of budgets—an increase of more than 25 per cent. On this tax-revenue, largely through his measures, was superimposed a rate-charge of over £250,000,000 for local expenditure, so that fully a third, and perhaps a half, of the whole national income is now being swallowed up by the tax-gatherer and rate-collector. Taxation of such a kind has never before been known in the world, and is nowhere paralleled to-day.

There is no country in which the burdens imposed by the State and the municipality approach those borne by the British people.

At the same time, the internal trade of the nation was impaired by a policy identical with that followed by Kerensky in Russia on the eve of the Bolshevik seizure of power. Just as Russia was disintegrated by the principle of "self-determination," adopted by the Germans in 1917 for the immediate purpose of splitting a series of weak States off from her, so has the United Kingdom been broken up. The creation of the "Free State" in Ireland is the precise analogue to the creation of the Ukraine and the welter of Baltic States, controlling Russian communications with the two vital seas. National unity which we so painfully secured with such hazard and risk, has been carelessly thrown away by a dictator, using the votes of a party which calls itself "Unionist." On the economic side, Kerensky's surrenders to blackmailing extremists in the Russian labour unions have been exactly reproduced here. Mr. Lloyd George had ample power to put down the Bolsheviks and revolutionaries in Great Britain, if he had had the "guts" to use it. Their capacity to injure British industry is based on their intimidation of individual trade unionists. When it was proposed that all votes for strikes should be taken by secret ballot under Government supervision, his Government resisted that measure. He knew who the conspirators were,

but left them at liberty to plot, precisely as Kerensky allowed Lenin to remain in Petrograd defying arrest. He was aware that they planned the long series of strikes in this country in communication with Lenin, in order to paralyse and destroy British industry, and thus, by creating catastrophic unemployment, to bring revolution. The messages which passed between the Bolsheviks here and in Petrograd were intercepted and read; the very payments made by Lenin to his kept Communist newspapers here were ascertained. But the British Kerensky remained inert and only talked.

One of the foundations of British industry and trade in the past was cheap coal. At this the revolutionaries struck, and they found a ready accomplice in the weakness of Mr. Lloyd George. The Coal Commission of 1919 was instituted by him with the object of nationalizing the mines. It brought in a report advising this fatal course; and it also recommended an immediate reduction of the working hours to seven, with a further reduction to only six hours in 1921. One of the immediate results of this scheme, which was only very partially applied, was that the production of coal fell and the price went up till the cost was on a jewellery basis. Wages were paid, under the threat of "direct action" (which meant war on the nation), that could not be earned, and before the coal control was abolished the taxpayer was being required to find a million sterling per week to

supplement the miners' wages ; and the whole industry was insolvent. The abolition of control and this dole was resisted in one of the fiercest strikes which history records. The revolutionaries called out the pumpmen and attempted to wreck the pits ; and at first were only feebly resisted by the Government, which allowed enormous damage to be done before it took military action to protect the safety workers. Even before this strike the export price of British coal had risen from 13s. 6d. per ton in 1914 to 47s. in 1919 and 79s. in 1920, so that it had been almost sextupled. Since the strike was defeated, rather by the action of the nation itself than by any energy of its autocrat, the price has fallen, but, even so, to-day British coal costs per ton about twice as much as German or American coal, so that a second handicap has been inflicted on British industry, in addition to crushing taxation.

Another blow was struck to British trade by greatly raising the cost of transport. The eight hours day was introduced on the railway system and one uniform wage rate was established. The cost of this measure was so enormous, raising the wage bill from £47,000,000 in 1913 to £173,000,000 in 1921, that another large dole had to be extracted from the taxpayer's pocket and to be handed over to the trade unions concerned. When railway control was abolished to avert the ruin of the State, freights and fares were raised to such a degree that they are now reacting violently on trade.

As even with these exorbitant charges many railways would not have earned their working expenses, the big lines were forced by Mr. Lloyd George to amalgamate with the small and poor lines, such as the Highland and the Cambrian, with the further consequence that one of the trader's greatest safeguards—competition between the companies—has been destroyed.

Mr. Lloyd George is credited with having remarked that the war has proved political economy not to exist. Such measures as the above suggest that this is not a mere malicious story, but that it is his real belief. He never seems to have understood that the capacity of this country to buy food and raw materials depends on its capacity to sell its products abroad, and that this again depends on the readiness of the customer overseas to buy. That customer is the real employer, and he dictates the cost of goods and the figure of wages. High wages are not irreconcilable with cheap goods, provided that the output rises in proportion to the rise in wages. But this is precisely what did not happen in England. The British miner during 1920 turned out in a week of work as much coal as the American miner in one day. The British docker's output fell so badly that it now costs 6s. to work a ton of cargo at Middlesborough, against 2s. at Antwerp. The shipbuilder's output fell so much that the reconditioning and repair of ships can be carried out 33 per cent. cheaper at Rotterdam than in British ports, and work

which cost £3 10s. in 1914 now costs £11 15s. per ton. But nowhere, perhaps, was the deliberate restriction of output under the criminal extravagance of Mr. Lloyd George better seen than in the business of building "homes for heroes." The cost of a cheaply built cottage before the war was about £250 to £300. It was swollen to £1,000 or even £1,200 in 1921, while the number of bricks laid per day, according to the Chairman of the L.C.C. Housing Committee, fell from between 800 and 1,000 in 1914, to 200 in 1921. It may be noted that in the United States the laying of 3,000 bricks a day is not regarded as any immoderate feat.

British goods thus became so dear that the foreign customer would not buy them, preferring to go elsewhere or do without, and the British customer had not the money for them. The clumsy arrangements for the adjustment of wages imposed by Mr. Lloyd George had not the elasticity needed to meet the economic changes that followed the peace, and one after another British works closed down or ran short time. At the beginning of the present year, a foreign expert who is quite dispassionate and knows this country well, after a careful tour of investigation, stated that the plants in the Midlands and the North were for the most part only producing at 20 to 25 per cent, of their capacity. Too high wages have driven their goods out of the market and deprived their workers of employment. The quantity of British exports has been

halved as compared with 1913, though the burden of taxes and rates on the British nation has been more than trebled.

Mr. Lloyd George's remedy for every malady is the payment of doles. Under him the various forms of "public assistance" or outdoor and indoor relief have risen to gigantic figures. They absorbed only £25,000,000 thirty years ago; they are estimated by such authorities as Mr. Drage to amount to £400,000,000 to-day. Three-fourths of the inhabitants are now receiving this "assistance" in one way or another. As the result, industries that are still producing are being loaded with yet heavier burdens. Thus in a case mentioned in the House of Commons in March, the rates on a shipbuilding yard rose from £2,100 in 1914 to £12,600 in 1922. The charges levied on the Bradford Dyers' Association and its workers for unemployment insurance are close upon £40,000 a year, and those on Guest, Keen & Nettlefold's, £83,000, apart from the employee's contribution—an entirely new burden since the end of the war.

With all this limitless expenditure which Mr. Lloyd George had not the energy to cut down, and much of which he himself imposed, the very security of the nation has been neglected. It was not denied by the Government in the debate on the Army Estimates that the dispatch of even so weak a force as that sent to France in August 1914 would be impossible without great delay, running into months. It will probably be

found that the vast supplies of munitions accumulated during the war have been allowed to rust or rot where they have not been sold or broken up. The total of British troops is even smaller than it was in 1914, and fresh obligations of the most serious character have been recklessly assumed in Mesopotamia and Palestine; while in Palestine grave trouble may be expected at any moment, if Mr. Lloyd George persists in the policy of forcing the tyranny of a small minority of Jews on Christians and Arabs; and Bolshevik or Kemalist irruptions into Kurdistan must also be anticipated. Moreover, in 1914 we had no land frontier in Ireland, such as the genius of the Prime Minister has created; and no mass of armed Communists and tribal Irish with tanks, machine guns and rifles, supplied by the British Government, in the "Free State." In 1914 India was peaceful; Mr. Lloyd George with Mr. Montagu's aid had not then roused it from its "pathetic contentment"; and Egypt was under thorough control. Without calling up the conscripts of the war it would be impossible to meet the demands of even a minor campaign. As for the British Air Force at home, it consists of only three squadrons of twelve machines each, and three in reserve, for all purposes other than naval defence; and the whole British Air Force has been reduced to only  $31\frac{1}{2}$  squadrons, scattered throughout the world.\* This is an almost

\* Having crippled the Air Force, Mr. Lloyd George in the summer of 1922 promised to strengthen it and to attempt to undo his own destructive work.

stupefying condition of weakness to those who know what the risks of air war are, and the possibilities of attack even by such a nominally disarmed nation as Germany. That risk is very real, as may be understood by any person who troubles to study the dispassionate article on Air Defence in the new volumes of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, which is based on the immense experience obtained in the war. Not only this, but aircraft are now becoming most formidable enemies of the capital ship, and it is quite uncertain whether in the future any navy without a very strong air force at its back will be able to hold the sea or lie in port. So seriously is the danger of attack from Germany taken in France that 220 squadrons of ten machines each are to be maintained during the present year. We, in this country, are existing on the sufferance of the French taxpayer, who is really providing for our security. Nor is there anything, except inherent incompetence, to prevent the tribal Irish from creating a dangerous air force with the money—taken from the British taxpayer—which Mr. Lloyd George has handed over to them. A nice outlook opens before the people of this country!

For the Navy, it is sufficient to say that even the one-Power standard has not been maintained, and that, as the Government admits, “things have been scraped to the bone.” At Washington, we sold our birthright of sea-power for a mess of pottage in the form of promises of American “sympathy,” which

have not been made good. The Hearst Press continues its anti-British propaganda, and plans for crippling our merchant shipping and driving it from American trade by a vast system of preferential rates and subsidies in aid of American tonnage, are under consideration by the American Government. The debt of £900,000,000, which as a nation we incurred during the war, mainly through backing the loans of the weaker Allies, is being demanded from us, though fresh tariff legislation has been passed which will tend to drive British goods altogether from the American market, and thus prevent us from paying. It is certainly an odd way of showing affection ; but it is the inevitable results of the "door-mat" policy pursued by the British Government towards Washington. We all hope for an honourable and friendly understanding with the United States ; it cannot be achieved by the tame surrender of British interests whenever they are attacked ; and it would be much better for both nations if Mr. Lloyd George had had the courage to say so bluntly.

Within the Empire, weak government has everywhere brought its invariable penalty in difficulty and disaffection. In India something like a rebellion was quelled by General Dyer at Amritsar, after a series of ferocious attacks on Europeans with heavy loss of life ; and General Dyer was at once repudiated by the Indian Government and denounced by Ministers at home. The results of that policy

have been seen in the rapid spread of sporadic disorder throughout the Indian Empire and in the natural hesitation of British officers to act, when they found that vigorous action on their part meant professional ruin. The Moplah rebellion smouldered on for months, involving far heavier sacrifices of life than General Dyer's drastic measures had necessitated, and the visit of the Prince of Wales was marked by a whole series of hostile demonstrations. In the past, British rule in India was unhesitatingly supported by the great mass of the Indian peoples and by the Indian princes, because it meant order and peace. Under the pusillanimous Coalition it meant the toleration of anarchy. The real danger in India was that there the history of Ireland might be repeated. Already the cost of government has risen greatly, as administrative feebleness always involves heavy expenditure ; and the Indian revolutionary is insistent in his demand for the imposition of fresh heavy duties on Lancashire cotton goods, which must mean a new blow to British industry. Lord Northcliffe's report on Indian conditions is that they reproduce in important respects the situation prior to the great Mutiny ; and that the life of Europeans has never been so insecure since the Mutiny as it is to-day.

In Egypt, the dictator capitulated bag and baggage to the extremists, after producing chaos by his constant changes of mind. Lord Allenby had to report on his recent visit to

London, that, in view of the promises made to the Egyptian nationalists, any other course but the grant of complete independence to Egypt would involve a serious war for which he had not the men or the means. Independence has been granted, though from the date of its conquest by Cambyses, Egypt has never been able to exist as an independent State, and though the surrender must endanger the vast sums which have been invested in the country to its immense benefit, under the guarantee of British rule. The provisions for the security of that main artery of British commerce, the Suez Canal, are such as to excite legitimate apprehension. In any case we may expect to see British trade in Egypt saddled with heavy tariff duties, and a fresh market lost.

But of all the surrenders of the Coalition, the gravest from every national point of view is that to Sinn Fein. It is grave because it is a capitulation to murder and crime, involving the betrayal of the loyal in Ireland and Ulster. There were two possible policies in Ireland after the war. The first was to establish Dominion Government at once, which as Mr. Bonar Law said, meant virtual independence, and involved the triumph of Sinn Fein. The second was to combat sedition and crime with all possible vigour. Neither policy was pursued. Dominion Government was not conceded. A half-hearted struggle with Sinn Fein was maintained till the summer of 1921, in the face of arson and assassination on a scale never before known in the British Isles. Many

of the leaders in this campaign of savagery had been in the hands of the British Government. Collins, a post-office sorter, who bolted from London to avoid conscription, was among the prominent conspirators arrested in 1916 and released in December of that year from Frongoch. De Valera was allowed to escape from a British prison, and the police were afterwards discouraged from effecting his arrest in Dublin. The hands of the police and military were tied in every conceivable way ; and the British Government actually paid the forces in arms against it by its unemployment doles. Finding that the murder of their comrades was in no way punished by the British Government, and that they were wretchedly supported by that Government, the Royal Irish Constabulary and the "Black and Tans" resorted to a policy of unofficial reprisals. When police were barbarously done to death, they retaliated by shooting Sinn Feiners. Irish criminals, if arrested, were almost invariably released after a brief term of imprisonment, so that they enjoyed practical immunity. Between January 1, 1919, and March 8, 1920, there were 1,089 crimes perpetrated by Sinn Fein, including the murder of thirty-one police and five civilians, and the attempted murder of sixty-five police and fourteen civilians ; and in scarcely a single case was the criminal punished by legal action. Gradually the scale of crime rose till it culminated in the butchery of twelve British officers on duty in Dublin on November 21, 1920, in cold

blood, some of them being killed in the presence of their wives. Still Mr. Lloyd George protested that he would fight murder to the death. He announced that Lincoln had faced a million casualties to save the American Union, and let it be understood that he would do the same. While he talked thus bravely on the platform, he was in secret attempting to open negotiations with the assassins.

The sequel came in June 1921, at a moment when the Sinn Fein movement was known to be on the verge of collapse, notwithstanding the feeble and irresolute attitude of the British Government. The King was used to make the desired move on behalf of the Prime Minister, in his speech at Belfast. A "truce" was "negotiated" which proved to be entirely one-sided, and which was impudently broken by Sinn Fein. Down to the passing of the Free State Act, eighteen of the R.I.C. were murdered; between December 6th and February 20th there were 116 attacks on the police or troops, in which thirteen of the King's forces were killed and thirty-six wounded. Under cover of the "truce," the men responsible for the assassination of 600 British officers and men and for a campaign of incendiarism in England, were invited to come to London and confer with the British Government. Mr. Lansing remarked, on the strength of his observations at Paris, that Mr. Lloyd George was "no negotiator," and this the discussions between the Sinn Feiners and himself only too clearly revealed. The conditions laid down

as indispensable bases by Mr. Lloyd George were one by one abandoned before the threats of the Terrorists. That Mr. Lloyd George was not impervious to these threats was shown by his sudden ejection of Sir Basil Thomson, the head of the "Special Branch" at Scotland Yard, from his post, because of a supposed failure to protect Chequers, near which establishment three Irishmen were seen—ascertained to have been entirely harmless. The end of the "negotiations" was the conclusion of the "Treaty," which destroys the United Kingdom and establishes a "Free State," whose nominal rulers (Collins and Co.) were not even required to swear allegiance to the King, and openly declared that they mean to use all their new powers to secure complete independence for Ireland. This is the "settlement" which Mr. Lloyd George achieved; and it was only achieved by promising the Sinn Feiners the cession of two Ulster counties, after he had assured Ulster that no alteration of frontier should be made without her consent. There was no time-limit in the "Treaty" within which the new "Free State" was to ratify it; and it had not been ratified at the fall of the Coalition.

Mr. Lloyd George once more sold his country for the smiles of people who could not deliver the purchase price. De Valera refused to accept the "Treaty"; and a struggle between Collins and De Valera began—the latter seeking the immediate establishment of an independent Irish republic. Meantime British

trade with Ireland, estimated at £150,000,000 a year, is coming to a standstill, and, at the best, has the prospect of being hampered by a hostile tariff; a valuable market has been sacrificed; a new language difficulty has been created by the introduction of Erse, which most of the Sinn Feiners do not even pretend to understand; a new currency is to follow; enormous charges have been laid on the British taxpayer; a land frontier has come into existence; and the whole South of Ireland has lapsed into anarchy, bloodshed and Bolshevism.

“By their fruits ye shall know them.” We can guess what posterity will say of this abject surrender which is as injurious to England as it is cruel to Ireland herself. With this great feat behind him, Mr. Lloyd George proceeded to the Genoa Conference to “reconstruct Europe,” by bringing “peace,” as he has “reconstructed” Ireland by his “Treaty” and its “settlement.” The real aim was to collude with the Bolsheviks, for whom, as has been seen since the days of the Paris Conference, he has always had an inexplicable affection. With them he concluded his “trade agreement” of 1920, which in effect gave them power to sell their stolen property in this country. It was heralded with the usual extravagant promises which have not been fulfilled. The total of British goods exported to Russia for eleven months last year is estimated officially at £2,300,000, and it is suspected that this figure is much above the

mark. But, even in the palmiest days before the war, British trade with Russia was never very considerable, varying over a long term of years between 3 and 5 per cent. of our total exports. From this, again, must be deducted our trade with the new Border States, now independent, so that there is no prospect of serious relief for our unemployed from that source. Ireland was a ten or fifteen times more important market before Mr. Lloyd George got to work to spread ruin there.

Genoa was devised as an election "stunt" in January, when Mr. Lloyd George contemplated an immediate appeal to the country. He clung to it obstinately because it kept him in the limelight and he fancied that it would win him votes. The immorality of conferring with brutal and treacherous criminals, such as the Russian Bolsheviks—men whom he himself denounced in the most violent terms—troubled him not one whit. No one but himself supposed that any good could come from Genoa. The United States would have nothing to do with the conference. The French Government was admittedly hostile to the whole business. If benefit to British trade were sought, a more immediate and practical method of securing it would have been, as Mr. Bonar Law said, to reduce expenditure and taxation at home, and thus enable our home market to revive. Russia has been so thoroughly ruined by her tyrants that the best judges believe an expenditure of at least £500,000,000 of capital will be necessary

to reconstruct her transport system; and who is likely to be fool enough to advance the money in face of the Russian record of repudiation? What was behind all this was a secret plan, dangled by the German multi-millionaire, Herr Stinnes, and cosmopolitan financers, before Mr. Lloyd George for a vast German exploitation of Russia with British money—which was positively to be advanced to Germany for that purpose—in exchange for a vague promise to pay over some part of the proceeds as “reparations.” It was another bargain with people who would not or could not deliver the goods. There was and is no cure for British trade troubles but internal peace (which the Bolsheviks are determined to prevent), hard work, the strictest entrenchment, and sane government. Genoa was a mere mirage, and a very costly and time-wasting mirage.\*

\* The treaty between the Bolsheviks and Germans at Genoa was received with affected surprise by Mr. Lloyd George, but its negotiation was known in Berlin a week before the document was signed, and the very terms were mentioned. What is not known is the secret understanding behind it, which undoubtedly exists, and is believed to contain provision for a development of the Soviet submarine and air forces under German direction. Mr. Lloyd George's friends are left to impale themselves on the horns of a dilemma: their wonderful leader must be either a fool or a trickster—a fool if he did not know of this treaty; a trickster if he went behind the backs of the Allies and encouraged the two criminal States in their intrigue. Remembering the Bullitt episode, the affair of the *Westminster Gazette* interview, and the treachery to Ulster in the Irish negotiations, no particular importance can be attached to any political statements made by Mr. Lloyd George himself. He will say what suits his interests at the moment.

It is true to-day, as it was true in 1802, when Count Woronzoff wrote it, that "if this Government lasts, the British Empire will not last," for "this Government" is the rule of a single man.\* If that single man were a Lincoln, a Cromwell, or a Napoleon, there might be hope; but he is a very ordinary human being, perverse by nature and a born intriguer; though possibly possessing some kindly qualities not *en evidence*. He has this incurable defect as a ruler, that he is by disposition what the Americans call a "quitter." He lacks moral toughness in his fibre and is altogether without tenacity. He will always yield before danger and difficulty because of these two defects, unless strong countervailing pressure is applied; and it is the shame of the Conservative party and its leaders that they have failed to apply it, and that they have palliated his reckless adventures by asserting that it is not his fault if he is unable to look beyond his nose. They declare him to be sincere when he denounces Bolshevism and then walks arm-in-arm with it. Charitably disposed persons may rank him with Marshal Bazaine, who undid one day what he had done the previous day, and never appeared to remember to-day what he said yesterday. Though Bazaine was sentenced to be shot, it now seems universally to be admitted that he was only weak in his want of principle and in his fatal propensity for intrigue; and

\* This was published in May 1922. Fortunately the Coalition Government has not lasted.

that he betrayed his country without intending it, and indeed believing that his retention of power was indispensable to it. But there is a less charitable view of Mr. Lloyd George to which circumstances are constraining an ever-increasing number of people, viz., that he is a malignant who enjoys injuring the interests of which he is trustee. Who knows ?

## TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD IN HIGH PLACES

THE exposure of charlatanry is never a pleasant business, and the writer hoped that there would be no need to return to the disagreeable topic of Mr. Lloyd George's record, after demonstrating that Mr. Lloyd George had certainly not won the war, though he and no one else had lost the peace. But his most mischievous intrigues against the Entente with France at Genoa ; the pontifical ukase delivered in April by his worthy secretary, Sir Edward Grigg, against two of the few remaining independent organs of the Press ; and the outburst against *The Times* in the same month, demand some further attention. The ukase against *The Times* and *Daily Mail* represented the climax of a systematic, carefully organized campaign for "nobbling" British newspapers. Some were bought outright by ardent followers of Mr. Lloyd George, who received titles in return for support. Others were captured by dispensing blandishments to their proprietors and staffs, or by the supply of exclusive and important news from the great propaganda department in Downing Street, which under the Coalition never relaxed its activity.

It was part of this campaign to represent all independent newspapers and periodicals which ventured to criticize the Prime Minister frankly and fairly, as taking part in a "vendetta." The phrase constantly recurred in the Lloyd George Press. It was repeated by Mr. Austen Chamberlain. We were to conceive British politics and world politics as a gigantic dog-fight between a "bad man" in the shape of Lord Northcliffe,\* and a sainted hero in the shape of Mr. Lloyd George. The "bad man" was pictured as always lurking around with a dagger. This, it need scarcely be said, was the purest rubbish. The Northcliffe Press supported Mr. Lloyd George all through the war, and only abandoned him when he abandoned the national cause for which, with all its faults, that Press stood resolutely and gloriously. Even the *Morning Post* and *Spectator*—journals which had nothing to do with Lord Northcliffe, and not infrequently exchanged shots with him, but which refused to sell their souls to the Coalition and maintained their independence with honour and dignity—were accused of taking part in this ridiculous "vendetta."† If four journals, all of the very first rank by the quality of their news and the independence

\* Shortly after these words were written Lord Northcliffe was struck down by his fatal illness.

† To the four should be added the *Saturday Review*, which under its present editor has shown no want of courage, and has firmly refused to pervert facts in the Lloyd George interest.

of their writing and criticism, under three distinct proprietors who had nothing in common but patriotism, agreed that Mr. Lloyd George's domination threatened catastrophe for Europe and our country, the explanation is not to be found in any "vendetta"—which is something wholly alien to the British spirit—but in the fact that Mr. Lloyd George's past and present prove him to be unprincipled as a man and incompetent as a politician.

If Mr. Lloyd George had possessed any trace of a sense of humour he would never have directed Sir E. Grigg to assemble the journalists of all countries at Genoa and ask them to warn the world against believing anything that was printed in *The Times* and *Daily Mail*, which, it appeared, was the habit of the public. The message was received with roars of laughter, which was precisely what it deserved. The choice of Sir Edward Grigg for this business was peculiar and unfortunate. He himself was for many years a member of *The Times* staff, and as such he was perfectly aware of the care and discrimination with which news is verified by independent journals. They employ the ablest brains, and have at their command the best sources of information. The representatives of *The Times* and *Daily Mail* at Genoa, for instance, were all men famous in the world of journalism and diplomacy. Mr. Wickham Steed was distinguished by an extraordinary knowledge of foreign statesmen and politics, and by an ability to speak every leading language in Europe with

ease. Mr. Ward Price accomplished the feat of securing the solitary and important interview that Marshal Foch granted during the Paris Conference. Mr. Reynolds was a master of the Russian language, and in close touch with Border-State and German affairs. All three were men of independent mind, beyond the reach of petty motives, and not to be coaxed or persuaded into saying what they do not honestly believe, and though all three were human, and therefore liable like any other human beings to make mistakes, their reports were those of good faith, and were therefore accepted by the British public.

Now what were the particular "false" allegations on the strength of which Mr. Lloyd George attacked *The Times* and *Daily Mail*? They were three. The first was that he had privy knowledge of the treaty between the Bolsheviks and Germans, which was the one positive result of all this wind-baggery at Genoa. The second was that he had had a number of private conversations with that well-known German-Bolshevik agent, Krassin, and that in those interviews he told him that the British Government was prepared to waive its claims for the payment by the Bolsheviks of the £567,983,000, lent by the British taxpayer to Russia during the war. The third, made by *The Times* correspondent, was subsequent to the other two, and was that Mr. Lloyd George, in a conversation with M. Barthou, the head of the French delegation, had "in substance told M. Barthou

that the Entente between Great Britain and France was at an end." Those allegations must be examined in detail and then the question must be asked whether Mr. Lloyd George's own account of his policy can be accepted.

As to the treaty,\* it was the logical result of the great German conspiracy to destroy Russia, which began in April 1917, when Lenin, his pockets stuffed with German money, was sent in a sealed saloon carriage through Germany to the Russian frontier, for the express purpose of demoralizing the Russian armies and wrecking Russia body and soul. Of the leading Bolsheviks, some half were on the Allied counter-espionage lists as German spies and agents—as Mr. Lloyd George well knew if he ever troubled to consult his information. Krassin figures on that list; so does Radek; so does Trotsky; so does Kameneff. The language used at the Smolny Institute, where in the early days of Bolshevism the Bolsheviks had their headquarters, was as often German as Russian. So far back as August 1, 1918, it is known from Helfferich's statements † (Helfferich was then representing Germany at Moscow) that Chicherin asked Germany definitely for military assistance against the Allies, proposed "parallel action,"

\* It must be taken in conjunction with the secret German-Bolshevik military convention of April 3, 1922, which is known to be a reality, and the full text of which has been published in London and Paris. It is an impudent infraction of the disarmament article in the Treaty of Versailles by Mr. Lloyd George's Boche and Bolshevik friends.

† *Der Weltkrieg*, 3. 466.

and suggested that though an "open military alliance" with Germany was then inexpedient in his view, the two despotic régimes ought to work in concert. "The strongest support of the Bolshevik régime at every critical moment was in the German Government," says Helfferich.\* The German Foreign Minister, Hintze, insisted that Germany "must keep on good terms with the Bolsheviks," and the complaisance of the German Foreign Office went so far as to suppress reports of German correspondents as to the real situation in Russia, and the true aims of the Bolsheviks. All this was known, but Mr. Lloyd George chose to forget it. He also knew that Brockdorff-Rantzau, a German diplomatist, in concert with the Bolsheviks, and with money supplied by the German Government, maintained a great Bolshevik propaganda department for action against the Allies, and particularly against England, in Ireland, India and Egypt, with its headquarters in southern Switzerland. He knew, that is to say, that Bolshevism and Bocheism are two of the deadliest and most inveterate enemies of the British Empire and of peace in Europe, and that the two are all but indistinguishable. Krassin was the agent of Rathenau in Russia. The Red Army was and is supplied with German munitions.† Its staff was and

\* *Der Weltkrieg*, 472.

† See *L'Apocalypse Russe*, Serge de Chessin, 323-4. M. Chessin is a Russian correspondent at Stockholm who knows Red Russia well.

is to a large extent composed of German officers, camouflaged under Russian names. German troops in 1920 made ready to support its attack on Poland, and are, according to all available information, again making ready for a new attack, if Trotsky, after his disastrous defeats in that year, ventures to repeat his campaign.

The terms of the treaty were mentioned in Berlin a week before it was signed at Genoa; two months before the signature, information that such a treaty was imminent had reached the French Government; and the British Foreign Office, unless its representatives in Berlin were fast asleep, must have given warning. The public had therefore the right to be astonished at Sir Robert Horne's "solemn assurance," given in an interview to a correspondent of one of the Coalition Sunday newspapers,

That no member of the British delegation had the slightest knowledge of it. We did not even know that negotiations for such a treaty were in progress. The fact of the treaty being signed came as a bombshell, and a great surprise to every one of us. The persistent way in which the allegation was made was little short of damnable.

If so, all that can be said is that such diplomatic incompetence should be met by Lord Fisher's favourite plan of "sacking the lot" of amateurs who made themselves the laughing-stock of Europe by being thus duped by Lenin and the Boche.\* Was there no hint

\* They have now (October 1922) been "sacked."

of this treaty in the private conversations which Rathenau is known to have held in this country during his visit a few months ago, when he was in the closest touch with agents of the Prime Minister? Did it not form part of Stinnes's plans? Or has Mr. Lloyd George once more, as in the business of the Bullitt mission, the *Westminster Gazette* interview, and the negotiations with the Sinn Fein gang (to which I shall shortly recur) not been quite candid with the more innocent and trustful members of his Government? In that case his "calmness," which we were all asked to admire after the "bombshell" had been exploded, would become quite intelligible, if not creditable, and his subsequent readiness to swallow the treaty and pretend that it was, after all, a matter of trifling importance, would be explained. People are not usually "calm" when their noses have been pulled in public; and this treaty was not a matter of trifling importance, but part of a deadly conspiracy against the peace of Europe and the safety of this country.

As for the secret interviews with Krassin and the promise said to have been given him regarding the Russian loans, it is to be noted that on the evidence of one of his most ingenuous admirers

Mr. Lloyd George, immediately on his arrival at Genoa, put himself into touch with the Russian delegates. In his eagerness to ensure the security of the future, he was quite ready to forget the past, with its long and bloody record of the Bolshevik régime. He invited the Soviet representatives

to his château, where he entertained them to lunch. To all appearances they fell captive to his characteristic charm.\*

The spectres of the twenty-two murdered Russian bishops ; of the 1,785,000 murdered Russian citizens ; of the British Naval Attaché, Captain Cromie, foully done to death by these same Soviet worthies, did not trouble the Prime Minister in his effusive hospitalities to cruel and cowardly criminals at Genoa, any more than the thought of the hideous crimes perpetrated in Ireland deterred him from fraternizing with Collins and Sinn Fein. Nor does it appear that he gave a moment's thought to the 800,000 miserable victims of the Bolsheviks now in prison or in hostage camps in Russia. Where, then, was the injustice in believing that, if he stooped to lunch the Bolshevik thugs in his château, he would ask them to tea ? Why was the one right and the other wrong ? If he "put himself in touch" with them at the outset, in furtherance of a deep and persistent scheme for giving them complete recognition and riveting their hold on hapless Russia, there was every probability that he would keep in touch with them throughout ; and it is not to be supposed that the correspondent who reported these interviews acted without information or knowledge of facts. It is that correspondent's veracity against Mr. Lloyd George's, and, as will be presently shown, Mr. Lloyd George's evidence cannot

\* *Pall Mall Gazette*, April 21st.

be accepted without the support of impartial and independent witnesses.

So far as concerns the promise to let Russia off, it was notorious, even before his departure for Genoa, that Mr. Lloyd George was talking of this to his intimates, and that his great news and propaganda department was hinting of it in the favoured Press organs. That the news was substantially correct is shown by the feebleness of the Memorandum presented to the Bolsheviks at Genoa. The Belgian Government refused to sign it because it admitted the repudiation of Belgian rights, and abandoned the common law of civilized Europe. The French Government aligned itself with Belgium in this attitude; and the French Press criticized the Memorandum in the severest terms, as "forcing the creditors of Russia to make a present to the Bolsheviks, and that, too, when the Bolsheviks have not promised anything in return." It was this attitude of France that led to the stormy interview between Mr. Lloyd George and M. Barthou. Now it is to be remarked that in the account of that interview which *The Times* correspondent at Genoa telegraphed, the substance of his statements is borne out by much independent evidence. The correspondent of the *Morning Post* at Genoa gave a very similar version. The French newspapers were in the closest agreement in their correspondents' reports. The *Daily Chronicle's* correspondent, who is known to be in intimate touch with Mr. Lloyd George, declared that

the "whole existence of the Entente" was "at stake . . . because the British public thinks that France is obstructing the peace on which it has set its heart." It is agreed on all sides that various members of the British delegation at Genoa, in their conversation, gave the impression that the Prime Minister was "looking for a British-German-Russian pact"; and the statement of M. Skirmunt, the Polish Premier, confirms the belief that Mr. Lloyd George himself was talking in the same strain. We may, then, suspect that the furious denunciations of the Northcliffe Press were due to the fact that that Press knew too much, and had learnt too much for Mr. Lloyd George's comfort. In that case, the situation which arose during the Paris Conference in March 1919 was exactly repeated at Genoa.

In March 1919, as was mentioned in a recent number of the *National Review*, the fact that Mr. Lloyd George was intriguing with the Bolsheviks and intended to accept Peace terms which would let Germany off and break all his pledges, came to the knowledge of Lord Northcliffe, and was through a friend of his conveyed to the Conservative majority in the House of Commons. This majority at that date had not abandoned its independence, and it took the most vigorous action, with the result that Mr. Lloyd George came home, and in the debate of April 16, 1919, repudiated his own attitude and denied his intrigues with the Bolsheviks.

His intrigues had begun as far back as December 1918, as we know from a French note bearing the date of December 5th of that year. It stated that the French Government declined to enter into any negotiations suggested by him

With the criminal régime of the Bolsheviks, which in no respects represents a democratic Government, or even any possibility of government, since it rests only on base passions, on anarchical oppression, on the denial of all the principles of public and private law. . . . If the Allies had the weakness or imprudence to act thus, they would in the first place deny the principles of justice and right which are their strength and their glory, and they would give the Bolshevik propaganda in the world such power and extension that they would risk being its first victims. The French Government, so far as it is concerned, will have no dealings with crime.\*

In February 1919 Mr. Lloyd George won over President Wilson to his views, and between them they sent Mr. Bullitt, a member of the American Peace Commission in Paris, to Russia to open negotiations with the Bolsheviks. Mr. Bullitt received his formal authorization (as he deposed before the American Senate in September 1919) on February 18, 1919, and left for Russia a few days later.

Before he left, he said in his deposition before the Senate :

I had a number of discussions with everyone concerned in it [the Russian negotiation] and on the very day that Colonel House and Mr. Lansing first asked me to undertake this mission to Russia I was dining at Mr. Lloyd George's apartments to discuss Russian affairs with his secretaries.†

\* Mermeix, *Combat de Trois*, 277-8.

† *The Bullitt Mission to Russia*, New York, 33.

### On a subsequent occasion

It was decided [by Mr. Lloyd George and Colonel House] that I should go at once to Russia to attempt to obtain from the Soviet Government an exact statement of the terms on which they were ready to stop fighting. . . . The plan was to make a proposal to the Soviet Government which would certainly be accepted. . . . Mr. Kerr [Mr. Philip Kerr, Mr. Lloyd George's secretary at that date] and I then talked and prepared what we thought might be the basis of peace with Russia . . . I was instructed to go in and bring back as quickly as possible a definite statement of exactly the terms the Soviet Government was ready to accept \*

Mr. Bullitt was offered conveyance in a British man-of-war by Mr. Lloyd George, who was kept informed throughout of Mr. Bullitt's proceedings. On his return to France with the Soviet terms, which included the recognition of Bolshevism, Mr. Bullitt says:

I had breakfast with Mr. Lloyd George at his apartment. General Smuts, Sir Maurice Hankey and Mr. Philip Kerr were also present. . . . I brought Mr. Lloyd George the official text of the [Soviet] proposal . . . Mr. Lloyd George, however, said that he did not know what he could do with British public opinion. He had a copy of the *Daily Mail* in his hand, and he said "As long as the British Press is doing this kind of thing, how can you expect me to be sensible about Russia ?" †

The chameleon, in fact, had decided to change its colour and its principles. Mr. Bullitt proceeds in his evidence :

About a week after I had handed to Mr. Lloyd George the official proposal with my own hands, in the presence of three

\* *The Bullitt Mission to Russia*, New York, 34-36.

† *Ib.*, 66.

other persons, he made a speech before the British Parliament, and gave the British people to understand that he knew nothing whatever about any such proposition. It was the most egregious case of misleading the public, perhaps the boldest that I have ever known in my life. . . . So flagrant was this that various members of the British Mission called on me at the Crillon a day or so later and apologized for the Prime Minister's action in the case.\*

Mr. Bullitt then read out to the Senate Mr. Lloyd George's statement in the House of Commons, which was as follows, according to Hansard :

*Mr. Clynes.*—Before the Rt. Hon. Gentleman passes to his next point, may I ask him whether he can make any statement on the approaches or the representations alleged to have been made to his Government by persons acting on behalf of such Government as there is in Central Russia ?

*Mr. Lloyd George.*—There were no approaches at all except what has appeared in the papers.

*Mr. Clynes.*—I put the question because it has been alleged that you have had them.

*Mr. Lloyd George.*—No. We have had no approaches at all. Of course, there are constantly men of all nationalities coming from and going to Russia, always coming back with their own tales from Russia. But we have had nothing authentic. We have had no approaches of any sort or kind. . . . I think I know to what the Rt. Hon. Gentleman refers. There was a suggestion that there was some young American who had come back. All I can say about that is that it is not for me to judge the value of these communications. But if the President of the United States had attached any value to them, he would have brought them before the Conference, and he certainly did not do so.

If this was not a careful *suppressio veri* and *suggestio falsi*, I should like to know what

\* *The Bullitt Mission to Russia*, New York, 93.

is. And Mr. Bullitt adds this stinging comment upon it :

It was explained to me by the members of the British delegation who called on me, that the reason for this deception was that although when Mr. Lloyd George got back to London he intended to make a statement very favourable to peace with Russia, he found that Lord Northcliffe, acting through Mr. Wickham Steed, the editor of *The Times*, and Mr. Winston Churchill, British Secretary for War, had rigged the Conservative majority of the House of Commons against him, and that they were ready to slay him then and there if he attempted to speak what was his own opinion at the moment on Russian policies.\*

With this evidence before it, the British public will be able to appreciate the exact value of Mr. Lloyd George's disclaimers regarding his attitude to Krassin and his negotiations with that dangerous adventurer. They now know "what was his own opinion"; that he was then deliberately in favour of "shaking hands with murder"; that, with President Wilson, he *did* approach the Bolsheviks; and that he *did* receive a communication from them. He misled the House of Commons; he misled the British nation. I shall now proceed to show that similar equivocation has marked him in other grave affairs, and that the evidence against him is cumulative.

For this Bullitt incident coincided with the affair of the *Westminster Gazette* interview, to which I have already very briefly referred. That interview was the result of several conversations between Mr. Lloyd George and

\* *The Bullitt Mission to Russia*, New York, 95.

Mr. Sisley Huddleston, who was then correspondent of the *Westminster Gazette* in Paris; it was published on March 31, 1919. It claimed to give "an authentic British view" derived from "a high authority." The opinions expressed in it were at once seen to be in direct opposition to the avowed policy of the British Government and to the pledges which Mr. Lloyd George had given. They were from the first attributed to Mr. Lloyd George, and this pronouncement on his part was one of the causes which led Lord Northcliffe to intervene. In the debate in the House of Commons on April 16, 1919—the same debate in which he repudiated Mr. Bullitt—Mr. Lloyd George derided the suspicions of the Conservative majority and indignantly asked on what foundation they rested. The *Westminster Gazette* was mentioned, whereupon the Prime Minister remarked: "Oh, really! Well, I am surprised!" and proceeded to ridicule people who could take such an interview seriously. He wound up by "complaining of the reliable source" whence they had obtained their information. We now know from Mr. Huddleston's evidence that the interview was in very fact with Mr. Lloyd George, and we have further corroboration of Mr. Huddleston's statement in the Memorandum, prepared by or for Mr. Lloyd George and published last March, with the date "March 25, 1919" upon it. In that Memorandum are all the ideas expressed in the interview, and a statement of the very

policy which as Prime Minister he afterwards had the audacity to repudiate and denounce in the House of Commons. The comment of the *Morning Post* could not be improved :

If Mr. Huddleston's assertion is true—and we believe it is—it follows that in 1919 the Prime Minister deliberately deceived the House and the country.

Once more he employed his familiar weapon, the *suggestio falsi*. When he was questioned on the subject on April 6th of the present year, after the publication of the Memorandum and Mr. Huddleston's statement, he declared :

I have no recollection of having any conversation at that time with a representative of the *Westminster Gazette* on the subject of the Peace Treaty, but at this distance of time it is difficult to recall the names of those with whom I discussed that subject in 1919, and therefore I am not prepared to say that I did not have a conversation.

He alleged that there were "serious errors," as he "always thought that pensions ought to be included" in the reparation charges to be paid by Germany. This appears to be true, but, as the arrangements for payment by Germany were eventually adjusted, largely through his own action and his pro-German attitude, the inclusion of pensions was a mere paper measure. The cost of the Pensions Ministry for four years has averaged over £90,000,000 annually, and not a farthing of contribution towards this gigantic amount has yet been received from Germany. That is one reason why the income tax is five shillings in the pound.

Two examples of "deliberate deception" of the House of Commons on one day should lead to a very careful scrutiny of any statement made by Mr. Lloyd George. There is also the affair of the Irish "negotiations" of last year. A definite pledge was given to the North of Ireland, when a Parliament was forced upon it, much against the wishes of the loyal population of Ulster, that the boundaries of the six counties should not be altered without the consent of their people. This same stipulation was contained in the "proposals" made to Sinn Fein, when Mr. Lloyd George decided to begin his course of surrender to that criminal organization. The "proposals" required "full recognition of the existing powers and privileges of the . . . Government of Northern Ireland, which cannot be abrogated except by their own consent." During the "negotiations," however, grave anxiety was aroused by statements in newspapers in the closest touch with Mr. Lloyd George, notably in the *Daily Express*, that the Sinn Fein leaders were demanding the cession to themselves of Fermanagh and Tyrone, and that the demand would be granted. The public was advised to "watch" those two counties. No repudiation of these statements was issued by the Prime Minister and his Press organization. The next thing that happened was that after the "settlement" Mr. Collins publicly asserted that the maps presented by him to the British Government gave him these two counties. I

do not pretend to know whether Collins was speaking the truth, but it is certain that efforts were made to induce Sir J. Craig to abandon Fermanagh and Tyrone to the tender mercies of the tribal Irish ; and it looks as though either Collins had been duped or Ulster had been deceived. There have, of course, been suggestions of Mr. Lloyd George's favourite remedy—a plebiscite, to get him out of the mud. But this would be cruelly unjust to the loyal in the two counties. They volunteered for the war ; they suffered heavy casualties in the war, when the Ulster Division covered the great battlefields with its dead ; while the Sinn Feiners stayed at home and did their best to stab the Allies in the back. It is possible, in consequence of the Loyalist war losses, that a plebiscite to-day might show a small balance in a large part of the two counties for Sinn Fein, with murderers waiting in the background to put out of the way any who voted against such a surrender. Of the eight members for these two counties in the North Ireland Parliament, four are Unionists and three are Sinn Fein, while one is a Nationalist. But the man who contemplates handing over to the welter of Irish anarchy these two counties because temporarily and owing to war casualties, the Unionist element is not overwhelming, deserves indictment for high treason. Such shame and discredit have been brought upon the ex-Prime Minister by his Irish policy that this particular piece of duplicity may not have untoward

results. Mr. Lloyd George may be quick to run away from Sinn Fein, as he ran away from the Bolsheviks in April 1919, when he begins to understand the real feeling of this country. As Lord Hugh Cecil remarked in the most biting speech ever addressed to a British Government: "With so much dis-honour, you might have bought a little peace."

It was not only after he became Prime Minister that Mr. Lloyd George developed his habit of untruthfulness. The affair of the Marconi shares and the part he played in that dismal business has not been forgotten. Early in 1912 negotiations began between the English Marconi Company and the British Government for the erection of wireless stations and the working of the Marconi system of wireless telegraphy. In July 1912 a contract was signed which was sharply criticized by experts on various grounds. About the same time reports were current in the City that Ministers had been speculating in Marconi shares. These were of several kinds. There was an English, an American and a Canadian Company, all separate, yet all forming part of one group, and the shares of all were the subject of dealings, and of violent speculation which attracted general attention in the spring of 1912. The fluctuations in price, particularly in the shares of the American Marconi Company, were such as to offer large profits to "punters," most of all if the speculators had

"inside" knowledge. The rumours that Ministers were dealing in "Marconi shares" were mentioned in the Press about that date.

It subsequently became known from evidence and admissions of the parties concerned that on April 17, 1912, Mr. Lloyd George and the Master of Elibank, who was then Liberal Chief Whip, had bought between them 2,000 shares of the American Marconi Company at £2 per share. Of these 2,000 shares they sold jointly 1,000 shares on April 20, 1912, at a price of £3 $\frac{5}{3}$  per share, thus making a profit of £1 $\frac{5}{2}$  per share, less brokerage, or, let us say, £550 apiece. Of the 500 shares which remained to Mr. Lloyd George, another 357 were sold for him soon after by a fellow Minister for £3 6s. 6d. apiece. So that in April 1912 Mr. Lloyd George had (1) made a clear cash profit on his speculation of over £700, and (2) had into the bargain 143 shares which had cost him nothing. This taste of "unearned increment" however, seems merely to have whetted his appetite. On May 22, 1912, he and the Master of Elibank bought on their joint account 3,000 more American Marconi shares at the price of £2 $\frac{5}{3}$ . The shares, it will be observed, had fallen heavily since their first purchase. They did not subsequently recover; and Mr. Lloyd George was left in debt to his brokers for an amount of £3,486, because he did not take up the shares. In October 1912 he paid £1,162 of this debt; the rest of the amount due was

provided by loans from his broker at varying rates per cent.

So that the British Chancellor of the Exchequer—for that was the office which at that date Mr. Lloyd George held—was dabbling in the shares of a company forming part of the Marconi group. The English Marconi Company held 34,174 shares in the American Marconi Company so far back as December 1911, and that holding was largely increased afterwards. The American Company's shares would be sympathetically affected by the success or failure of the English Company in its negotiations with the British Government, which were not completed till July 19, 1912. This was not an honourable position for a British Chancellor of the Exchequer, still less for a Minister who had attacked Mr. Joseph Chamberlain during the Boer War on the pretext that he held shares in Messrs. Kynoch's, a well-known firm that made ammunition, and that Mr. Chamberlain waged that war to fill his own pockets. Mr. Lloyd George said, for example, on January 6, 1902 :

Judas only finished himself, but this man [Mr. Chamberlain] finished thousands. Mr. Chamberlain prevented peace. In South Africa people were murdering each other, and the price had to be paid by us and our children's children for generations. Meantime, Messrs. Kynoch & Co. had declared a 10 per cent. bonus.

It was quite untrue that Mr. Chamberlain held shares in Kynoch's, and Mr. Lloyd George

knew it, yet he did not hesitate to circulate this falsehood. The only basis for his malignant charge was that Mr. Arthur Chamberlain, a brother of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, but of entirely opposed political views, hostile to the Boer War and sympathetic to Mr. Lloyd George's own party, was the chairman of Kynoch's, and had been chairman long before the Boer War.

On December 10, 1900, the supposed iniquities of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain were the subject of an indictment against him in the House of Commons by Mr. Lloyd George, which is of importance because of its bearing on the Marconi gamble. He cited two principles laid down by Mr. Chamberlain, and endorsed their application to British Ministers. The first was enunciated in the case of a High Commissioner for South Africa who had held some shares in Rhodesian companies :

The Rt. Hon. Gentleman [Mr. Chamberlain] said that a person appointed to represent the Queen should not only be pure, but, like Cæsar's wife, above suspicion. It was not merely enough that an officer of the State should be incorruptible, but he must have no association with companies, either past or present association, which would make him open to suspicion.

The second principle laid down by Mr. Chamberlain and quoted with approval by Mr. Lloyd George, was this :

No officer [in the employment of the Colonial Office] shall be allowed to engage in commercial pursuits . . . nor shall any officer make or continue an investment which may

interest him privately in any private or public undertaking with which his public duty is connected. All officers shall confidentially consult the Government as regards any investment which may reasonably be open to doubt.

Let it be added that Mr. Lloyd George's slanders were repudiated by his own Party, and were shown to be entirely devoid of foundation. Mr. Chamberlain had no investments that came under the rules which he had laid down. The important fact, however, is that Mr. Lloyd George, in this particular debate, enounced and approved principles which twelve years later he was to violate.

On October 11, 1912, the Marconi agreement was debated in the House of Commons, and in the course of the debate there was repeated reference to the rumours that Ministers or their relatives had bought "Marconi shares." A Select Committee was appointed to investigate the agreement, and a statement was made by a Minister which, in the words of a Radical pro-Ministerial organ, the *Nation*, was taken to disclaim "*any* participation by *any* Minister in *any* Marconi undertaking." In this disclaimer Mr. Lloyd George was definitely included. During the debate Mr. Lansbury, who was then in Parliament as a Labour Member, made some reference to the rumours current, whereupon Mr. Lloyd George burst in with the following remarks :

The Hon. Member said something about the Government, and he has talked about "rumours." I want to know what these rumours are. If the Hon. Gentleman has any charge

to make against the Government as a whole or against individual members of it, I think it ought to be stated openly. The reason why the Government wanted a frank discussion before going to Committee was because we wanted to bring here these rumours, these sinister rumours, that have been passing from one foul lip to another behind the backs of the House.

Yet "these rumours, these sinister rumours" as to dealings in "Marconi shares" were true. At a moment when, as was stated by Mr. (now Sir) Herbert Samuel, the Government's agreement with the English Marconi Company was not completed, but was waiting definite ratification (which was not given until July 19th), Mr. Lloyd George held shares in the American Marconi Company—a subsidiary. Nor had he acted on Mr. Chamberlain's principle, as endorsed by himself in 1900, of consulting the Government as to his investment. On the contrary, if Mr. Asquith, then Prime Minister, can be trusted, Mr. Lloyd George had allowed his friends to leave the Premier grossly misinformed as to the true facts. Asked on March 26, 1913, whether the Attorney-General and Chancellor of the Exchequer had told him before the debate on October 11, 1912, that they had been dealing in American Marconi shares, Mr. Asquith replied :

I was informed by the Master of Elibank [Lord Murray] at the end of July or the beginning of August that he and the Attorney-General and the Chancellor of the Exchequer had purchased shares in an American Marconi Company. . . . Both assured me that the purchase was made after

the publication of the contract between the Post Office and the English Marconi Company, and that the American company had no interest, direct or indirect, in that contract.

The purchases, it will be seen, were really made in April and May 1912, while according to Mr. Samuel (who was then Postmaster-General) "there was no contract" until July 19, 1912; and though on March 7, 1912, there had been a "letter written by the Post Office to (the English Marconi Company) accepting the tender upon which a contract was subsequently based," it was, according to the Postmaster-General, "merely the acceptance of a preliminary tender." Mr. Lloyd George, by the comment of his own Radical friends in the Press, left the House of Commons under an entire misapprehension, when a truthful man with a clear conscience would have made a frank disclosure and would have said: "I did not speculate in English Marconi shares, but as 'Marconi shares' have been mentioned specifically in the rumours, I did buy and sell a considerable number of American Marconis, and I am still holding some 1,600 of them." He did not begin to confess until March 19, 1913, when he brought a libel action against a French newspaper, and even then he did not admit the whole truth, as it was afterwards dragged out of him. What made the whole business more odious was that one of his fellow-speculators in the Government privately informed certain members of the Marconi Select Committee who were "going to examine the journalists"

of the facts, or of some part of the facts; and it was noticed that these members were most careful to head investigation off the shares of the American Marconi Company.

To sum up this Marconi business: Mr. Lloyd George speculated in shares of a Marconi company when the English Marconi Company was negotiating with the Government. He broke his own rule that a British Minister should be "not only pure, but, like Cæsar's wife, above suspicion." He hid certain vital facts from Mr. Asquith, the head of the Government, when, again by his own principle, it was his duty to consult the Government regarding an investment which was certainly "reasonably open to doubt." In his interruption of Mr. Lansbury he deliberately conveyed a totally false impression to the House of Commons. He did not disclose the truth to the Marconi Select Committee. The whole story, like his speeches claiming for himself the sole credit for the provision of munitions during the war, leaves an ugly taste—all the uglier because of his previous and subsequent affectation of superior virtue. He complained in a ridiculous speech at a luncheon given to celebrate his whitewashing by the Marconi Select Committee, that he had "been assailed by a hideous monster that sought our lives," and exultantly declared "we have slaughtered it." But he only escaped by the skin of his teeth. By a strict Party vote of 346 to 268, the House of Commons accepted his and his colleagues'

expressions of regret, and acquitted them of acting otherwise than in good faith. The general sense of the public is undoubtedly conveyed by Mr. George Buckle, in his article on "English History" in the new edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, where he says :

Public opinion was more severe than Parliament. It was shocked that important Ministers, and especially the guardian of the Treasury, should show themselves so wanting in delicacy and prudence in pecuniary matters. . . . Mr. Lloyd George at once endeavoured to divert attention from his own indiscretions to the shortcomings of the landlords.

The man who complained that he was criticized severely for what even the most indulgent must admit was one of the gravest mistakes ever committed by a British Minister, was a rancorous and untruthful critic of others. Passing over such amenities as his bestowal of the title of "cat's-meat man" on the editor of the *National Review* for the part the Review took in bringing out the facts of the Marconi affair, Mr. Lloyd George vilified his country's soldiers and statesmen unceasingly throughout the Boer War. I have already noted some of his attacks on Mr. Chamberlain. He also accused Mr. Chamberlain of want of courage because he

Strolled among orchids 6,000 miles away from the deadly bark of the Mauser rifle. At his door all these deaths lie—Mr. Joseph Chamberlain who never faced the danger, sends thousands of braver men than himself to their death.

Yet his own bravery was not conspicuous then or afterwards. He bolted from a public meeting in the Town Hall at Birmingham, where he was announced to make a speech reviling Mr. Chamberlain, and disguised himself as a policeman, which may have been prudent but was certainly not heroic. I do not remember that during the Great War he showed any particular liking for going under fire: but we all do remember the alarms and excursions at Chequers during the Sinn Fein campaign of murder in this country.

Continuing his campaign of vilification, he declared in the House of Commons that the mortality of Boer women and children in the concentration camps, which were provided for their safety, "had earned for Sir A. Milner his peerage." He denounced General Bruce Hamilton—a humane and generous soldier—as "Brute Hamilton." And throughout, as his own statements indicate, his opposition to the war was dictated less by the sincere belief that it was wrong, than by the expectation that it would prove unpopular, and, as he said on October 27, 1899, that "there would be a reaction against the Government before long." He was shouting with what he imagined to be the larger mob.

After the war he continued his record of reckless mendacity by circulating the most astounding untruths regarding the employment of Chinese labour on the Rand. He

was among the foremost in spreading the "Chinese slavery" lie, which his Party dropped like a red-hot coal immediately after the election of 1906. Mr. Churchill, as Colonial Secretary, publicly confessed that such labour "cannot in the opinion of H.M.'s Government be classified as slavery in the extreme acceptance of the word without some risk of terminological inexactitude."\* But before the general election of 1906 was decided Mr. Lloyd George declared,† amidst other choice misrepresentations, that Chinese labour had been introduced to South Africa "under conditions tantamount to slavery. What would they say to introducing Chinamen at a shilling a day to Welsh quarries?" "Slavery on the hills of Wales!" he exclaimed, exploiting to the utmost the credulity of his audience. "What have they got in South Africa?" he asked rhetorically, and answered, "Chinese labour, Chinese slavery." He told the public, "You have the Union Jack waving over the slave compounds in Africa"; and he even had the effrontery to allege that "the Chinese were kept like dogs in a kennel; they were treated as very few men treated their beasts." Chinese labour had "every one of the essentials of slavery." Yet it was admitted by the Radical *Westminster Gazette* that "the Chinese were housed, fed, and looked

\* Mr. Churchill, Hansard, February 22, 1906.

† At Newport, January 15, 1906.

after better than the working population of England ! ” \*

How clear, convincing, eloquent and bold,  
The bare-faced lie, with manly courage told !  
Which spoke in public, falls with greater force,  
And heard by hundreds, is believed of course.

The famous Budget of 1909 was floated on a sea of similar slanders and misrepresentations. No man has more impudently disregarded the Ninth Commandment than Mr. Lloyd George, or so maliciously attributed evil motives to his political opponents. Yet it is quite possible to be a great democratic statesman without imputing the basest motives or departing from the truth. If Lincoln’s speeches, for instance, be examined, in them all will be observed a note of fairness and generosity to his Southern antagonists. He never made a charge which he was not fully able to substantiate, and he generally shrank from making any charges at all.

To a hope which saw the Delectable Mountains of absolute justice and peace in the future, to a faith that God in His own time would give to all men the things convenient to them, he added a charity which embraced in its deep bosom all the good and the bad, all the virtues and the infirmities of men, and a patience like that of Nature, which in its vast and fruitful activity knows neither haste nor rest (*Abraham Lincoln: A History*, Nicolay and Hay, 10, 355).

With that man there was no shouting of abuse, and his truthfulness was never impugned. His supreme charity was indeed

\* April 17, 1905.

the noblest distinction of a character singular in its beauty and sympathy. Mr. Lloyd George's invectives against the owners of land and the Lords show him to be of quite a different mould. They were untrue; and they were also full of malice, coarseness, and the worst and basest of class-hatred. Thus of Lord Midleton's succession to the peerage our highly-placed hooligan observed :

The Lords wanted no testimonial; they did not even require a medical certificate to say that they were sound in either body or mind. They merely required a certificate of birth, to prove that they were the first of the litter.

Or again, mark his outburst against the Duke of Bedford, an exemplary landlord, a single-minded patriot, and a most generous benefactor of charity :

He wanted the Duke of Bedford to pay taxation on the value of his property. His Budget was simply a second edition of Kipling's famous ballad, "Cook's son, Duke's son, son of a belted earl. Pay, pay, pay." When he said that to the Peers, they replied : "What, ask us to pay? Why, our end of the telephone is the receiver."

No fable was too venomous to be retailed. The world has not yet entirely forgotten the lie about the "Gentle Shepherd," which was trotted out as an example of landlord's justice :

My friend, the Home Secretary, and I the other day paid a visit to Dartmoor. On that bleak, mist-sodden upland I saw an old man of 65 in a convict garb who had been sentenced to thirteen years' penal servitude because, under the influence of drink, he had broken into a church poor-box and stolen 2s.

Mr. Lloyd George in this fragment of eloquence at Mile End did not tell his audience that the old shepherd had really spent thirty-three years in prison because of his penchant for robbing poor boxes in churches, which was his speciality, or that he only took 2s. on this occasion because there was no more to take. The old gentleman was released a few weeks later, on January 6, 1911, and sent to a farm which he promised not to leave without the consent of the Home Office. Four days afterwards he was missing, and at his former business, in which, in such spare moments as he has been given, he has been since engaged. It was only the other day that he was again convicted.

Some will remember the "rare and refreshing fruit" promised to the workers of the country as the result of Mr. Lloyd George's new land taxes in 1909. They were to be "fertile taxes, taxes that will bring forth fruit," that were to "cut a new path . . . through the brambles and thorns of poverty. An easier one and pleasanter one through fields of waving corn." They were by their author invested with mystical properties. They were to create a new world, to provide "work for all and bread for all"; they were to stop "robbery"; they were to take "only a halfpenny, just a copper." They were to promote the building of comfortable homes for "the people." The real value of these taxes was shown by the cash results which led to their being quietly dropped in

1920. They disorganized the building trade without assisting the Exchequer. They injured the very persons whom they were supposed to be going to benefit, and up to the close of April 1913, the last complete year before the war, had brought in only £223,000, while the expense of valuation and collection had been £1,393,000. So that it cost £1 to collect each 3s. 6d. as the consequence of Mr. Lloyd George's amateur finance. There was another and much more serious side to them. The land taxes, as had been predicted by all who knew the real conditions at the time, stopped building. Between 1906 and 1909 there was by official statistics an annual average increase of 80,000 cottages and small houses in Great Britain under the annual value of £20. In 1910, with the new taxes, the figure fell to 10,600; in 1911 it was 16,300; in 1912, 15,900; in 1913, 15,700; in 1914, 16,800. The house famine was mainly the work of Mr. Lloyd George and of his false promises and fatuous meddling. The land taxes, the super-taxes, and the murderous income tax have since those days driven many of the great landowners to sell their estates and leave their houses; but the "rare and refreshing fruit" is still to seek.

It might indeed be said that Mr. Lloyd George will always say what suits his particular purpose for the moment with an entire indifference to the truth. If he wants "facts" he will invent them or seize on any idle story, as of the ravages committed by pheasants

on mangel-wurzels, which made the whole sporting world split its sides. His speeches in his two campaigns for his Budget and for his land schemes were packed with distortions or positive untruths, until the frequent exposures of him made him a public bore. The accuracy of his figures may be seen from two examples, which are typical and fair. He asserted, on the authority of "Mr. McPher-  
son," that "there are 3,000,000 acres of deer forests in Scotland, and tens of thousands of people are turned out of their homes in order to get sport." The truth was that the Royal Commission on Deer Forests in 1892 had scheduled an area of only 317,000 acres of deer forest, and that this area had subsequently diminished. An offer made by the Duke of Sutherland to sell 170,000 acres of this land for 22s. 6d. per acre, or about its prairie value, was promptly made and found no takers. The canny Scot knows quite well that there is no Golconda in the moors of Sutherland. Mr. Lloyd George's figures in this case were nearly 1,000 per cent. too large. They were even further out in a terrible tale which he told of St. Pancras :

The annual value of St. Pancras is something like £2,500,000. Within a generation from now, almost the whole of that will pass into the hands of as many landlords as I have got fingers.

There are over 1,550 owners of land to-day in St. Pancras, and Mr. Lloyd George has only ten fingers—including two thumbs.

The record might be followed through the Health Insurance campaign, with its false promises which have slowly faded away; with its “cities of refuge,” of which the less said the better, since they do not exist; with its attack on the doctors, accused of an “unpleasant wrangle in the sick-room,” and all the other hocus-pocus which has so long ago been found out. To-day, unfortunately, the same methods of slander and distortion are being applied by the same man to foreign policy. He is turning them against the Allies of the British nation in the Great War for his own obscure purposes and to screen his own complete diplomatic failure. He made the wildest and most extravagant promises of the results from the Genoa Conference. It was to be a new “ninepence-for-fourpence” miracle, achieved by inducing the Bolsheviks to open Russia to trade, when at once Europe was to return to peace and prosperity. To all sane minds the very idea seemed absurd, and the United States refused to have anything to do with the Conference. Mr. Lloyd George was warned by Mr. Asquith that Genoa was a “dark and doubtful adventure.” Mr. Bonar Law, who was only too prone to see things with Mr. Lloyd George’s eyes, admitted that “that kind of Government (the Bolshevik régime) is impossible, and you will gain nothing by trading with it; indeed, there cannot be any trade.” Mr. Chamberlain, who was usually the mere echo of his Prime Minister, was equally certain that “there can be no sub-

stantial trade with Russia until confidence is restored." Mr. Churchill was, if possible, even less hopeful. "Russia," he said, "the granary of Europe, has been reduced to a desert." In fact, there was nothing to trade in or with, since the "bulging corn-bins" are now admittedly a figment of the Premier's imagination, and Mr. Lloyd George's colleagues understood this from the first. The Conference was a gamble, like the dealings in the "Marconi shares"; and it was a gamble in which the amateur was certain to burn his fingers.

When the Prime Minister accused *The Times* of "deliberate and malicious invention" in its account of his own conversation with M. Barthou concerning the attitude of Belgium and France to the Memorandum which was to be sent to the Bolsheviks, and when Mr. Chamberlain denounced that newspaper for "deliberately" setting to work "to misrepresent and traduce," had either of them noticed what their own Coalition newspapers have been saying? The *Observer* compared M. Poincaré to the man who torpedoed the *Lusitania*. The *Sunday Times* compared him to Nero, who fiddled while Rome was burning. Other organs of the Coalition Press vied with each other in insults to France and charges against her. Take for example, this morsel published in the *Evening Standard* of May 4th:

France assumes, and possibly rightly, that Germany will avoid as far as possible fulfilling her financial obligations, and it is well known that she contemplated a further seizure

of German territory. I do not argue the wisdom of that proceeding. I do emphasize that in diplomatic circles there is a conviction that this will produce a German-Russian military alliance, that Poland will be annihilated, and that Germany—where the military power is by no means broken—will then turn upon France.

These things have only to be stated for the dread significance of them to be realized.

What immediately concerns us is the information which reaches me this morning—the source of which it is impossible to divulge—that within the last fortnight there has been a great but quiet congregation of French aeroplanes on the coast of the English Channel. Why ?

*Habemus confitentem reum.* We had here from Mr. Lloyd George's own propaganda laboratory the admission that German "military power is by no means broken," and a wild tale that France was preparing to attack ourselves. The *Evening Standard's* news was capable of no other interpretation. Mr. Crummles wondered how certain things got into the papers. Those who know how the Coalition worked did not. But this they did see, that the Coalition Press was preparing for a break with France. And, naturally enough, the independent British newspapers which fought against this treacherous and damnable policy were attacked at every point by Mr. Lloyd George's bravoes.

What Mr. Lloyd George sought is still an enigma. Possibly his real aim was to make himself a British Lenin ; and after wrecking the Conservative party as he wrecked the Liberal Party, to pass over to the ranks of extreme Labour. But the country, as it

looks upon the hell “which smokes and flames against the nadir sky” in Ireland, can now perceive whither his methods lead. It is beginning to understand that, as the late Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson said, he is “working with the King’s enemies,” and against the Allies of the British nation and Empire. It sees in him a man with a “yellow streak,” who “seems to be animated with a feeling of profound respect, almost bordering upon affection, for all who have done him (and his country) any bold and violent wrong”; who has not only “shaken hands with murder,” but actually proposed to lend the murderers a huge sum of British money, with which to rivet their base and degrading despotism upon Russia, and to carry on their propaganda against every vital British interest. Wherever it turns, it recognizes the fruit of his deeds—in stricken trade and reckless taxation and waste at home; in the chaos into which he has thrown our foreign relations; in an Ireland abandoned to Bolshevism; in an Egypt where the great work of past Empire-builders is being wrecked, and where the appearance of a French or Italian force is only a question of time to restore order if the present British policy is maintained; in an India, where our own countrymen and the deeper interests of the Indian population have been callously sacrificed by his cowardice and indecision. If the Conservative party does not cut loose once and for all from its subservience to his dictator-

ship, then it is marching to the greatest disaster at the polls which political history has ever recorded, and it will carry with it in its fall and disgrace the British Empire.

Let it remember its ideals, and the words on the wreath for our dead murdered in Ireland, that was laid on the Cenotaph : " How long, O Lord, holy and just and true, dost Thou not judge and avenge our blood on them that dwell on the earth ? "

How long ? how long ? \*

\* It was not long. On October 19th the Conservative Party liberated itself from the dictator, whose power instantly collapsed.

## THE IRISH TREASON AND ITS AUTHORS

"Be not deceived : God is not mocked : 'for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap.'"<sup>22</sup>—GALATIANS vi. 7.

OVER twenty-six counties of Ireland, populated by the tribal Irish, law and order have ceased. The British flag has been lowered ; the forces of the British Crown have been withdrawn, except for a brigade which has thoughtfully been placed in a dangerous position in Dublin by our Coalition Ministers. The Royal Irish Constabulary have been disbanded and thrown to their enemies with a callous indifference which has never been surpassed in the history of any administration, however base and cowardly, and scores of them have been murdered without an inquiry or anything more than a perfunctory expression of regret from the Government which they so faithfully served, and without the customary message of sympathy to their families. Collins, that "honourable" man, before his death confessed that Ireland is approaching bankruptcy. Others of his colleagues predict an early famine. Cardinal Logue, who did nothing to stop the campaign of crime in its early days, now utters threnodies, and tells the tribal Irish

that "there seems to be a curse falling upon our people." Justice has ceased ; government itself has ceased ; a country, one of the richest in the world, with one of the most favoured geographical positions, is lapsing into Russian anarchy and misery. Brigandage is more rife than in the Two Sicilies under their worst rulers. Life is unsafer than in any country of the west. "Gunmen" rule, and their will serves instead of law. Freedom of the Press is extinct. Except the correspondent of the *Morning Post* there is no British journalist in tribal Irish territory who dares to tell the truth. The Irish Press is under the heel of armed assassins. The *Freeman's Journal*, for some slight velleities of independence and a declaration in favour of the Treaty, had its machinery smashed, a not unjust reward, I may say in passing, for a newspaper which for decades had stimulated sedition and separation. Freedom of election does not exist. At the recent election independent Sinn Fein candidates, distasteful to the prevalent junta of Collins and De Valera, were shot through the body, required to withdraw at the pistol muzzle or subjected to gross personal indignity.

Cultivation of the land is ceasing in many counties. Men will not sow where they are not certain of enjoying the proceeds of their energy. Farms are being seized by "gunmen" or raided and plundered by them. The loyal population of Southern Ireland, after being disarmed by the Coalition Government, is being terrorized, kidnapped, murdered, or expelled.

British officers and soldiers were also kidnapped and murdered without that Government lifting a finger in their cause. Piracy on the high seas has been committed by tribal Irish organizations, in the seizure of the British War Office steamer *Upnor*, with ammunition and arms, which, quite characteristically, was left without proper escort. Every conceivable humiliation was heaped, apparently of set purpose, on the King's forces in Ireland by the Coalition, and by a certain Mr. A. W. Cope, the Assistant Under-Secretary in Dublin, who is also a C.B. and a C.B.E., and whose proceedings demand close investigation. Such are the first consequences of the destruction of the Union and the creation of what is untruthfully called the "Irish Free State," by the supineness and unfaithfulness of the Coalition Government. As Mr. Lloyd George contemplates his work, he must be proud. Perhaps now he is beginning to understand the force of Lord Carson's warning: "If you tell your Empire in India, in Egypt, and all over the world that you have not got the men, the money, the pluck, the inclination, and the backing to restore law and order in a country within twenty miles of your own shore, you may well begin to abandon the attempt to make British rule prevail through the Empire at all." Scuttle in Ireland means scuttle and surrender everywhere.

This terrible situation has been created by the treachery of certain Conservative leaders,\*

\* They have now, fortunately, resigned office.

and by Mr. Lloyd George's political quackery. When Mr. Balfour's Government fell in 1905, it left Ireland contented and prosperous as the result of some ten years of wise and firm control. In 1906, Lord Bryce, a Liberal and Home Ruler, admitted that "Ireland has not been so peaceful and free from crime for two hundred years." A decade of administration by Mr. Birrell changed all that. Sinn Fein, a seditious organization which had as one of its mottoes, "burn everything from England except the coal," and which openly proposed to establish an Irish republic, was permitted by his indolence and feebleness to arm and spread like a rank weed through tribal Ireland. When the war came with Germany—largely because the German Government imagined that England would be paralysed by Irish conspirators—Southern Ireland remained aloof, despite the gallant lead given by a very few Nationalists, such as the two Redmonds and Mr. Gwynn. Sinn Fein imported rifles and explosives, maintained relations with Germany, and took every possible step to hamper the Allies in their desperate struggle for liberty. While the North of Ireland responded gloriously to the appeal for men, most of the Southern Ireland \* formations had to be filled

\* The military and political incapacity of the Southern Irish is very remarkable and is borne out by the American figures as to the intelligence of Irish-born recruits raised for the American Army during the war. Whereas the English-born recruits stood at the head of all, above even the Scotch, the Irish came very low indeed. In the United States the Southern Irish supply most of the gunmen and the political

up with English recruits, and Yorkshiremen, much against their will, were drafted wholesale into so-called Irish battalions.

In April, 1916, in intimate co-operation with the German Government came the landing of Casement, and the outbreak of armed rebellion, in which Sinn Feiners mercilessly slaughtered British wounded, and murdered unarmed men of the Veteran Corps in the streets of Dublin. Had the rebellion succeeded, Germany would have gained priceless bases for her U-boat operations against British communications, and the defeat of the Allies would have been the certain result. It was put down with speed and with ease, owing to the contemptible feebleness of the Sinn Fein "army," though the British force in Dublin did not exceed 5,000 men; and a few of the chief criminals were summarily executed. A large number of the leading conspirators were arrested, and a check was given to the whole Sinn Fein movement. But the work of the soldiers in the field was at once undone by civilian Ministers. Mr. Asquith a few weeks later proceeded to release many of the rebels who were interned. In December, 1916, Mr. Lloyd George became Prime Minister, and Michael Collins, a Post Office sorter, who had fled

harpies that prey on the great cities such as New York and Boston. There they are a mischievous and a parasitic element. In the British Dominions their tendencies are much the same. It is therefore probable that the collapse of Irish industry, and the fall of Irish credit and prosperity, following the expulsion of the British elements from Southern Ireland, will be irreparable.

from London to escape conscription, and had been one of the principals in the rebellion, was liberated from Frongoch, where he was interned, and he at once proceeded to organize sedition in Ireland. At short intervals other Sinn Fein criminals were turned loose. The effect was felt immediately. British Intelligence reports stated that in County Clare there was quiet up to June, 1917, but in June "there was great unrest due to the flooding of the country with Sinn Fein released rebel prisoners, and canvassers for De Valera." The same results were reported about the same time in Cork, Galway, Kerry and elsewhere. By the close of 1917, the Intelligence Department of the Admiralty, under its very capable head, Sir Reginald Hall, was compelled to regard the southern and western coast of Ireland as enemy country. Attacks were made on British soldiers, while the coast patrol, so necessary for protection against the murderous German submarines, could not do its work. But to all warnings and remonstrances, whether from the military or naval authorities, Mr. Lloyd George turned a deaf ear. Throughout this period, Ireland was exempted from conscription, from the rigorous food control and rationing, and from the various war measures enforced in England and Scotland.

This race could choose  
All sacrifice and service to refuse ;  
And, while the rest of Europe starved and bled,  
Sulked in its tents, well-shielded and well-fed ;  
Heard freedom shriek, but only struck one blow—  
And struck it on behalf of freedom's foe.

The only charitable explanation of Mr. Lloyd George's conduct is that he imagined he could combat sedition by ignoring it, and so took no steps to deal with the poisonous growth of Sinn Fein. But in view of his action elsewhere, of his behaviour to the Bolsheviks and of his mischievous surrenders to disloyalty in India and Egypt, it is certainly permissible to regard him as a politician animated with a bitter hostility to the British Empire, which has always been an object of special dislike to the British Radical. Whether malignancy or sheer indolence was at the root of his policy, the results were equally disastrous. Year after year outrages multiplied while he twiddled his thumbs. These are official figures showing how Sinn Fein, aided by official lethargy, developed its campaign of terrorism :

	1917	1918	1919	1920 (Jan.-June.)
Political murders .	11	10	26	199
Attacks on trains ..	4	7	13	45

At the same time, other outrages multiplied. From January 1, 1919, to June 30, 1920, no fewer than 33 court houses and 366 R.I.C. barracks were destroyed, and 19 coastguard stations and lighthouses were raided for explosives. Most of the murders of police were committed with a brutality and savagery which added to their horror. Often the murderers were known, but it was impossible to secure their conviction. No one ventured to give evidence against them, and no jury

dared to return a verdict of guilty in their case, as the certain and immediate result would have been the murder of the jurymen. When prisoners were tried by court martial, witnesses were too terrified to come forward.

Such was the state of affairs before the policy of reprisals began, and before the "Black and Tans," or the Special Constabulary, were formed to deal with the criminals. The R.I.C. week after week saw friends and comrades cruelly done to death. They were shot with expanding bullets, tortured, mutilated; for the Southern Irish have a diabolical vein of inhumanity. Before a single "Black and Tan" arrived in Ireland the Sinn Feiners had murdered over 100 officials, soldiers and loyalists, assaulted and cut off the hair of a large number of Irish women and girls, burned at least 50 houses of relatives or wives of the Irish Constabulary, and established a reign of terror. By the laws of war and the accepted practice of civilized nations, when bands of armed conspirators murder by stealth, use forbidden weapons, and destroy telegraphs or attack railways, "a belligerent is justified in requiring the aid of the civilian population to prevent the recurrence of hostile acts, and in serious and urgent cases in resorting to reprisals." The British *Manual of Military Law* from which this quotation is taken, goes on to state that the "mere fact that reprisals may be expected, if violations of the laws of war are committed, acts as a deterrent; they are not a means of punishment or of arbitrary

vengeance, but of coercion." Thus, in the United States during the war when communist sabotage became serious at German instigation, in a Western State a communist was publicly hanged by the populace, though it was not proved that he had had any direct share in the crimes. The sabotage stopped at once. Again, in Italy in 1920-1 when the Bolshevik menace became dangerous and murders of civilians and officials common, the Fascisti organization took action by shooting some communist—selected at random—whenever an innocent person was murdered. The result was that the Bolsheviks very quickly abandoned their cruel and cowardly attacks. The Fascisti achieved complete success and saved Italy from all the horrors of a red revolution. The sacrifice of life by them was small, and may be contrasted with the 1,785,000 executions which the Bolsheviks of Russia cynically admit.

The definite official adoption by the British Government of a policy of reprisals, on military lines and controlled by military law, as the answer to grave crimes and hideous outrages, would have quickly stopped the Sinn Fein campaign. But the Government had neither the courage nor the energy required for such a course. It tolerated reprisals at the outset while shirking responsibility for them, and when it was pressed in the House of Commons, forbade them altogether, to the immense joy of the traitors in Ireland. The King's loyal servants were daily and hourly exposed to

assassination, while the Sinn Feiner knew that unless he was detected in the very act of murder in the presence of numerous British witnesses, he was safe from anything more serious than a few weeks or months of detention. But, even with this extraordinary handicap on the Irish forces, by the close of 1920 Sinn Fein was in a difficult position. The total strength of the Royal Irish Constabulary had risen to 11,800, and, according to a Sinn Fein document seized, there was such "a lot of terror creeping into the Republican ranks" that the game seemed up. Collins and his associates were "on the run." Mr. Lloyd George and his fellow Ministers loudly proclaimed their fixed determination to crush murder at whatever cost. Thus he said at Carnarvon on October 9, 1920 :

Undoubtedly you must restore order [in Ireland] by methods very stern. You cannot permit the country to be debased into a condition of complete anarchy. A small body of assassins, a real murder gang, dominate the country and terrorize it and make it impossible for reasonable men to come together to consider the best way of governing their country. They are intimidating not Unionists not Protestants, but men of their own faith who would be only too anxious to discuss the quickest and best method of restoring order and good government in their country, if they were left alone. Therefore it is essential in the interest of Ireland that that gang should be broken up.

Unfortunately, as I have shown in a previous article in the *National Review*, when Mr. Lloyd George uses brave words of this kind he is generally at work in the background, selling

the pass. And in this case he was busy, fettering the King's forces and stealthily negotiating or attempting to negotiate behind the backs of the fighting men with the rebels and murderers. What deepens the shame of the situation is that he had as his accomplices certain leaders of the Conservative party, certain so-called Unionists.

The police and the military were hampered at every turn by the treachery of certain Government officials. The Government departments in Ireland contained hundreds of Sinn Feiners ; the Post Office was packed with them ; and even in London there were serious "leakages." No effort was made to purge the departments of these dangerous traitors, who still take the King's money and give information to the King's enemies. Eamon de Valera—an alien born in New York, son of a Spaniard and an Irish mother—who had escaped from prison in Lincoln in circumstances which illustrated the imbecile feebleness and carelessness of the British authorities, was allowed to return to Dublin, and active measures for his arrest were discouraged. The campaign of crime spread to England and Scotland, and still the British Government remained inert and refused to take effective steps against the nation's enemies. To put the facts bluntly, it was afraid to do so. Lincoln in a similar crisis in the United States in the civil war, bravely faced assassination. British Ministers simply "funked." Irish gunmen were despatched to England to burn

and terrorize, while the Government looked on. Farms and warehouses were set on fire ; the dead body of a man who had been shot by Sinn Feiners was found on a golf course in Middlesex on April 3, 1921. Persons connected with the Royal Irish Constabulary in England were savagely attacked. A gang of criminals, more cruel and more dangerous than the Irish Invincibles—who murdered Mr. Burke and Lord Frederick Cavendish in Phœnix Park—were allowed to continue their operations without any effort being made to strengthen the law against them. Those of them that were arrested and convicted were afterwards released after a short period of imprisonment. The effect of their activity on Ministers' nerves was remarkable. One Minister, learning that gunmen were known to be looking for him, at once hurried off, announced that he was indisposed, remained in hiding, and was not again seen in his office until the "truce." There was a scare at Chequers when certain quite harmless Irishmen were seen near that residence of the Prime Minister ; and there were other panics of which the less said the better. While these deeds were proceeding, an emissary under an assumed name went to Dublin, with the knowledge of Mr. Lloyd George, to open negotiations with De Valera and Collins. Yet no less a person than Sir Hamar Greenwood, the Irish Secretary, had said of Collins and his staff, that "that is the centre of the murder gang," and had also said that "Sinn Fein hails every evidence

of good will as a sign of weakness." Sir Hamar had described the Sinn Fein organization as intended "to smash up the British Empire." With this organization, and with the murderers at its head, Mr. Lloyd George and the Conservative leaders were now parleying, while British soldiers and Irish Constabulary were every day being ambushed, assassinated, wounded or shot at.

In the midst of these shady pourparlers, the Government still continued in public to protest its fixed determination not to negotiate with murder, but to put down the murderers. In the House of Lords, Lord Birkenhead, answering the Archbishop of Canterbury, who had lifted up his voice in favour of Sinn Fein, said, for instance :

I do not believe that there is one right reverend prelate who would be bold enough to offer the view that without the assertion of force—force in its most extreme and vigorous assertion—you can cure the mischief by which we are assailed in Ireland to-day.

And on June 9, 1921, he said :

The Government would exercise any degree of coercion in their power in order to destroy such a dastardly policy and those who carried it out. If it were necessary to send 20,000 more men to hunt the murder gang to their holes, the Government were prepared to send them.

Sir Hamar Greenwood loudly proclaimed that the Government had "murder on the run" and would shortly have the murderers rounded up. And, in actual fact, despite all the feebleness of Ministers, despite all the

treachery of officials, despite the stealthy intrigues which discouraged the loyal forces of the Crown and encouraged the traitors, the Sinn Feiners were in a very desperate pass in June, 1921, when the Government suddenly put up the white flag and abjectly surrendered.

Mr. Lloyd George's method of doing this was to drag the King into the business. When his Majesty visited Belfast to open the Parliament of Northern Ireland—a Parliament that had been forced upon Ulster against her will as the sole means of escape from further treachery on the part of British Ministers—he made his well-known appeal to Southern Ireland, presumably written by Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Lloyd George, to forgive and forget, and join in making a new era of "peace, contentment and good will." A few days later a formal meeting of the Parliament of Southern Ireland took place at which only 4 members out of 128 attended and took the oath of allegiance. The other 124, chosen by intimidation (as in Sir Hamar Greenwood's words, "anyone who did not vote Sinn Fein was terrorized from voting at all") refused to appear, and constituted themselves the illegal assembly known by the unpronounceable name of Dail Eireann. This was not a promising sequel. But on June 24, true to his Conference-habit, and miserably abandoning all his previously announced resolves on no account to treat with murderers, Mr. Lloyd George invited De Valera to a Conference in

London, "to explore to the utmost the possibility of a settlement."

Yet the King's speech at Belfast had produced no "atmosphere of peace." In the eighteen days which followed it, forty-eight soldiers and police were murdered and eighty-four were wounded. General Smuts was sent to Ireland, "with the full assent of the King and the Cabinet," to plead with De Valera and entreat him graciously to take part in "exploring avenues"; and on July 11, 1921, a "truce" of the most extraordinary and haphazard character was patched up, the name of the same Mr. Cope, who has already been mentioned, appearing as one of the British signatories. There was no clear statement as to how it should be terminated, nor were penalties provided if its conditions were not observed; and the terms as published by Sinn Fein and the British Government differed. The British version forbade all attacks on Crown forces and civilians, prohibited the use of arms, and provided for the cessation of military manœuvres. The Sinn Fein version only promised abstinence from provocative display of forces and from interference with Government or private property. But as the terms were impudently disregarded by Sinn Fein they are of small importance.

On July 20, Mr. Lloyd George made to De Valera "proposals for an Irish settlement," offering Sinn Fein that Ireland should "assume forthwith the status of a Dominion," and should have complete financial autonomy and

the right to maintain her own military forces. Seven conditions were laid down as vital ; the British Navy was alone to control the seas round Ireland and Great Britain and to have essential privileges in the Irish harbours ; the Irish Territorial force was to be limited in numbers conforming to the forces of Great Britain ; the British Air Force was to have " facilities " in Ireland ; voluntary recruiting for the British forces was to be permitted in Ireland ; no protective duties were to be imposed on either side ; Ireland was to assume responsibility for a share of the Imperial debt ; and there was to be " full recognition of the existing powers and privileges " of the Government of Northern Ireland. These terms went far beyond anything of which any person in Great Britain had dreamed. They permitted Ireland to maintain large military forces. Their danger had been pointed out by Mr. Lloyd George himself in earlier speeches. Thus he had said :

Do not take these risks [of Ireland having an army and an air force]. This is a great country. It has done more for human freedom than any other country. Do not risk its destinies and its future through any folly or through any fear of any gang in Ireland.

And, again, on October 9, 1920, at Carnarvon :

The Irish temperament is too uncertain a factor for us to risk the whole life of Britain upon the chance that they will always act rationally and never lose their temper at the wrong moment.

And yet again, on June 15, 1921, only a few days before his surrender :

There can be no doubt in the mind of any reasonable man that if Ireland were given complete independence, with its own army and control of its own ports and powers to enter into treaties with foreign countries, whether they were friendly or hostile to us, that would place Britain in a position of such peril that I should hesitate to think what might befall in the event of a repetition of either the great struggle with Napoleon or the struggle with Germany.

All these powers, all these privileges he now proceeded to offer under only the flimsiest make-believes of safeguards, with the complicity of certain Conservative leaders, who had a positive majority in the House of Commons and were pledged to defend and maintain the Union. History does not record such another act of political treachery.

Worse was to follow. One surrender to assassins brings inevitably further surrenders. The murder gang knew that they were dealing with cowards, and determined to press them to the utmost. As a preliminary they forced the British Government to release a Sinn Fein member of Dail Eireann who had been convicted of the murder of a district inspector of the R.I.C.—a miserable act of political poltroonery and a criminal betrayal of justice. Yet all the cringing to De Valera and his gang produced nothing. He scorned “eyewash,” replied demanding “amicable but absolute separation,” and peremptorily rejected even the Dominion status which British poli-

ticians down to this date had pronounced too dangerous for England to be even considered.

On August 19, Mr. Lloyd George declared that the Government had gone to the very limits of possible concessions ; that the outline of the terms could not be altered nor the basis changed, though he would be ready to discuss them in detail. There followed some weeks of humble grovelling before the Sinn Feiners, to induce them to pretend to accept the offered terms, with many winks and nods to them to assure that they would be allowed to do what they liked, after a Treaty had once been signed. This period was variegated by the Gairloch panic. Mr. Lloyd George was taking his holiday at that place when a strange ship put in to the coast, and a wild report suddenly spread that she was a Sinn Fein pirate, come to carry off the Premier. What might have happened no one can say, but the panic was allayed by the unconscionable Lord Birkenhead walking ashore from her. He had come to help in the great betrayal of the cause on which he had raised himself to place and power. Mr. Lloyd George abandoned a demand he had made that Sinn Fein should definitely recant its contention that Ireland was an independent Republic. In the meantime, Sinn Fein outrages were proceeding on an ever-growing scale in Ulster ; the red flag was flying over Cork Harbour offices ; police in Ireland were being shot at ; and the drilling and arming of Sinn Fein continued with increasing energy.

When the conference met as the result of all these British surrenders, the Sinn Feiners maintained their claim to complete independence and appeared in London as representing an Irish Republic and as treating on equal terms with the British Government. They were, as Mr. Lloyd George had himself said on March 31, 1920, "putting forward the same claim in exactly the same language as Mr. Jefferson Davis" (leader of the Confederate secessionists in the American Civil War), so that the Prime Minister was under no delusions as to the danger. Stealthily and behind the backs of the nation he and his colleagues of the Unionist party had surrendered point by point their "vital" conditions. They gave Ireland the right to have an army limited only by the vague paper restriction, that its establishment "shall not exceed in size such proportion of the military establishments maintained in Great Britain as that which the population of Ireland bears to the population of Great Britain"—a restriction which means nothing at all and is meant to mean nothing. Yet Mr. Lloyd George said on November 11, 1920 :

I warn Labour members . . . that if you were to give an army of that kind in Ireland, which under full powers of Dominion Home Rule would be given it, conscription for this country would be inevitable.\*

He gave Southern Ireland the right to maintain an air force, which will have our

\* The introduction of conscription was hinted at by the Free State Government in October 1922.

large towns in England and Scotland at its mercy. He gave Southern Ireland the right to maintain a navy and to control the Irish ports, subject only to the use of certain of them by the British fleet, though he had said :

As for the navy there are smaller countries than Ireland that have got navies and you do not want an expensive navy to be formidable to this country. Submarine bases, submarines, and small craft would be dangerous. It is tempting Ireland.\*

And again :

What a menace the creeks of Ireland could be to the security of the Empire ; how they (the Irish) plotted to use them, how they did use them, and how they would have used them much more fatally to the detriment of this country if we had not had a complete grip on them ! That grip we mean to maintain. It is vital to Britain. . . . It is not well that a small nation like Ireland should be tempted, lured by the enemies of Britain into a course which would be disastrous to herself. . . . We cannot consent to anything which will enable Ireland to organize an army and a navy of her own.†

He gave Sinn Fein the right to impose protective tariffs and thus to wreck British export trade to Ireland though he had said on March 31, 1920 :

There are certain powers which might be conferred on Ireland when she settles down and accepts union and works union, but which if given to her in her present mood would be used only for the hurt of the United Kingdom and her own hurt. It would be placing dangerous weapons in the hands of an infuriated people. Take customs. Handed over

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\* Nov. 11, 1920.

† Ib.

now they would be used inevitably for the purposes of making war on Great Britain.

He gave Sinn Fein power to enter into treaties with foreign countries which he had justly declared to be fatal to British security, with full knowledge that Sinn Fein had already opened negotiations with Russia and the Kemalists. He whittled down the oath of allegiance to the King till it became worthless and meaningless. The financial provisions of the Treaty are unintelligible, but the net effect is that enormous fresh burdens will be laid on the British taxpayer; and it is suspected that further secret promises of payments from the British purse were made by the scuttlers to Collins and his associates. The whole "Treaty" of December 6, 1921, was vitiated by the diplomatic ignorance and business incapacity of Mr. Lloyd George. It is vague, capable of various interpretations, and obviously so designed as to make the position of Ulster almost impossible. It contained no time limit of any sort, another proof of Mr. Lansing's judgment that "Mr. Lloyd George is no negotiator."

This document, which even in the United States has been condemned as naked separatism and destructive of the unity of the United Kingdom, and which Mr. Hearst's newspapers describe as "wrung from British cowardice," must have been announced by Mr. Lloyd George in terms of hyperbole to the King, who was induced by such misleading information to dispatch this telegram of congratua-

lation to the men who had signed away the safety of our country :

I am overjoyed to hear the splendid news which you have just sent me. I congratulate you with all my heart on the successful termination of the difficult and protracted negotiations which is due to the patient and conciliatory spirit which you have shown.

An effort was made by the politicians to persuade the public to demonstrate and burn bonfires, but the British public knows Ireland better than its timid Cuthberts of the Front Bench, and it also remembers what came of a similar surrender after Majuba in another quarter. It realized that the terms of the Treaty had not been settled on their merits but that, in Lord Carson's grim words to Ministers, "they were passed with a revolver pointed at your head, and you know it." Nor was there any justification for rejoicing. De Valera instantly repudiated the oath of allegiance and declared for a republic, and even Collins, whom the Government had accepted as Sinn Fein plenipotentiary and lauded as an "honourable" man, despite all his murders, announced that he meant to work for the complete independence of Ireland.

The goods for which Mr. Lloyd George and the Unionist leaders had paid by this dismal series of surrenders, were not delivered. All Sinn Fein criminals, even those who had burned and attempted to murder in England, were set free, and returned to the gunman business. Sinn Fein at once laid claim to

two of the six counties of Ulster and to the city of Londonderry as well. Outrages continued ; between December 6 and February 20, 13 of the King's forces were killed and 36 wounded. Collins maintained a "kind of war" on De Valera, and the republican force which was used to extract—with the aid of the accommodating Mr. Cope—Crossley tenders, machine guns, rifles, ammunition and even, it is said, tanks, from the British Government. That he was sincere was doubted from the first by those who knew him and his associates, and the inevitable result was a "frame-up" with De Valera, in the "pact" between these two worthies, on May 21.\* In this "pact" they agreed to fix a joint panel for the elections, or in other words, to rig them. In explaining the "pact" to Ard Fheis, the Sinn Fein caucus, both De Valera and Collins used threatening language. De Valera declared that "the condition in the South had prevented us from concentrating our attention on the position in the north-east corner," which pointed plainly to the resolve to attack Ulster in force. And in actual fact at that moment, as Mr. Churchill had to admit, "there were two divisions of the so-called Irish republican army in Fermanagh and Tyrone," the two counties of Northern Ireland which Mr. Lloyd George is said to have promised Sinn Fein at the Conference and the surrender of which Collins peremptorily demanded. Collins, after announc-

\* 1922.

ing on May 3rd, that "the Treaty was only a step to a republic" said on May 23rd :

If that condition of affairs (the "pact") imperilled the Treaty, they had to face the situation in this manner : They had made an agreement which they thought would bring stable conditions, and if those stable conditions were more valuable than any other conditions, they must face what those stable conditions would enable them to face.

The words are clumsy and incoherent, for the intellect of Sinn Fein is not of an exalted type. Collins entered into a combination with a man, who openly professed himself a republican and was engaged in war on Ulster, to prevent any free expression of opinion at the Irish election on the Treaty. Its paper clauses remained to dupe the British Government, which only asked for "eyewash" with which to keep the House of Commons quiet. British Ministers at first angrily reproached Collins for "so poor and meek a spirit" in thus surrendering to De Valera and the gunmen, asserting piteously that the opponents of the Treaty were only 2 per cent. of the Irish population, and forgetting that they themselves had set Collins the example by capitulating to his murder gang. They talked of "sordid bandits and ruffians," which very adequately describes the governing authorities of Sinn Fein. But then they quickly determined on fresh surrenders. The word went out that Collins had been obliged to come to terms with De Valera, "to prevent anarchy and restore order," Un-

fortunately the returns of outrages conclusively disproved the value of this excuse. In the week following the "pact," two British soldiers were brutally murdered; two ex-members of the R.I.C. were killed in their homes; all the ex-R.I.C. men in Tullamore were ordered to leave; a British ex-officer was expelled from his house in Galway; many houses of Protestants were attacked; Annagh House was burnt down; the Athenry mails were robbed; Protestants were expelled from various places under threat of death; railways were cut; farmers' houses were robbed, and two banks were raided. So far from the operations against Ulster being suspended, they were intensified, though republican troops could no longer be disowned by Collins. Pettigo and Belleek, two Ulster towns, were occupied by tribal Irish troops (who were some weeks later ejected by British forces, from which they ran like rabbits). Tribal Irish intercepted trains running into Londonderry, which under the insane arrangement of the frontier achieved by Mr. Lloyd George's negotiations, cannot be approached without passing through Irish territory by the Great Northern Railway. Irish gunmen seized explosives in Lancashire for a new campaign against life and property in this country.

Mr. Lloyd George and his Unionist followers swallowed the "pact"; they swallowed the explanation—or pretended to do so; and they have since swallowed a further series of Irish demands in the new Free State Con-

stitution. But what were we to expect from them, when Mr. Churchill explained their attitude as one of "credulous good faith"?\* Credulity, it may be said, does not excuse a defaulting trustee from punishment. It is a vice, not a virtue, and it was the particular vice which led directly up to the terrible war with Germany, because Mr. Lloyd George and his friends accepted or professed to accept any assurance with which German diplomacy put them off, and refused to arm and prepare. As for "good faith," that is not a word which the Coalition leaders could honestly employ. Throughout these negotiations they betrayed national interests committed to their charge, misled their country, concealed from it vital facts, and yielded its security to the threats of blackmailers. There was no "good faith" in such a process, but rather abject poltroonery. Messrs. Chamberlain, Lloyd George and Churchill have vaunted their "generosity" to Sinn Fein. It is not the business of faithful trustees to be "generous" with the assets of their *cestui que trust*.

The Free State Constitution, as drafted by the Sinn Feiners, is described by one of the most enthusiastic friends of Sinn Fein in this country as an "impish" production.

To induce the British Government to allow its nose to be pulled once more, Collins sent Griffith to act as his ambassador. Griffith's mission was to provide plenty of "eyewash," as Mr. Lloyd George's eagerness to "explore

\* In the House of Commons, May 31, 1922.

avenues" and "find formulas" for surrender was notorious; but if that failed there was always the pistol in the background. Griffith is understood, according to the Coalition Press, "to have given every assurance." But from more veracious sources it is known that the tribal Irish objected to the Privy Council as the final court of appeal, and to other conditions of nominal union with the British Empire.

A *de facto* republic of anarchists exists in Ireland and the Coalition Government in 1922 was drifting rapidly towards its definite recognition. Its protests that it would never permit an independent Irish republic will not convince those who have read the earlier assurances, which I have quoted in this article, that it would never negotiate with the murder gang. We know their value now.

For this state of affairs, more even than Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Birkenhead are responsible. They knew what Mr. Lloyd George was; they had the power to control and bridle him but they had not the courage or the honesty to exert that power. They sold their followers more shamefully than Peel sold the Conservative party in 1846—an act which lowered for generations the standards of British public morality. It was their plain duty in view of the past, of their pledges, of their attitude up to June 20, 1921, to stand aside sooner than have any part in the surrender to Sinn Fein. Even if they believed in their hearts that such a surrender

was necessary, they were not the men to make it without covering their party and their own reputations with ignominy. As times change and new occasions arise, an iron consistency may be impossible, but the leader who in June 1921 says one thing and in July 1921, without any modifying circumstance, says the precise opposite to save his skin and remain in office, must be branded as a turncoat.

There can be no remedy for such surrenders and betrayals, with their abiding menace to the safety of our country, but in the extrication of the Conservative party from the Coalition, the re-assertion of its independence, and the choice of new leaders whom it can trust. It might fare worse than in choosing Sir Henry Wilson, who is a soldier, an orator, a man, and a diplomatist. But it must have a chief whose hands are not fatally stained with this Sinn Fein pitch in which Mr. Chamberlain and the nominal leaders have dabbled.\*

There is a strong resurgence of Conservative feeling in Great Britain and it should be used for the nation's good. The voting in London for the L.C.C. and Guardians' elections, and the voting in the municipal elections throughout the country, make this clear. Liberalism,† Radicalism, Separatism and the pusillanimous policy of the Conservative renegades have been

\* Mr. Bonar Law had no part in the surrender and his hands are clean. This was written before Sinn Fein murdered Sir H. Wilson.

† The result at Newport has confirmed my own judgment.

decisively tried. The failure is so stupendous that the British people feel they must change the system which has produced it and punish the politicians responsible for it, if Great Britain is not to go under. In other days, a Strafford was indicted and beheaded for conspiring with the Irish ; and Mr. Lloyd George has conspired with Sinn Fein against the British Empire, as the words from his own speeches show. With open eyes he has given it powers which he himself has warned his countrymen must prove fatal to British security. He may still ask for a mandate against revolutionary Communism in this country (which works hand in hand with Sinn Fein), at the coming election, but if by any failure of public perspicacity he were to get a majority, he may sell the pass once more to the Communists.\* The Kerensky temper is always to run away, if it is not held up by countervailing pressure and fear.

\* In October 1922 he is reported to be already on good terms with his old extreme Socialist friends, so there is hope that they may receive his disastrous support.

## THE REAL CRIMINALS

"And Nathan said unto David : Thou art the man."<sup>11</sup>

By a strange stroke of misfortune within a few weeks the two most formidable opponents of the Coalition have been removed by murder or by illness.\* Sir Henry Wilson, who might have led a new and regenerated Conservative party, sleeps in his quiet grave, where the cowardice of politicians and their betrayal of our fighting men will trouble him no longer. The Coalition Ministers who sat, complacent but pale, listening to his funeral service, lost no time hinting through their organs that he ought to be forgotten as quickly as may be. In that particular part of a Coalition newspaper which reflected Downing Street and its mean voices, appeared this astounding paragraph :

What may be a dangerous precedent has been set in the placing of a floral sword at the base of the Cenotaph to the memory of the late Sir Henry Wilson. (*Evening Standard*, June 29th.)

Such tributes should be forbidden, it proceeded, or where should we be ? We might even find ourselves regularly commemorating

\* Lord Northcliffe died on August 14, 1922. This article appeared in August.

English heroes and martyrs—a really terrible prospect. It presently appeared on a careful search that this newspaper had uttered not a word of protest when a "floral tribute" was laid on the Cenotaph in memory of Mr. McSwiney, the Cork Mayor who committed suicide by hunger striking, after waging war on the British nation. So it was right in Coalition eyes to commemorate enemies of this nation, and wrong to honour British patriots.

The truth is that the Coalition Ministers knew in their hearts, whatever tales they served up to Parliament or to their tame newspapers, that they had a direct and terrible responsibility for this crime ; and therefore they wanted the very name of Sir Henry Wilson buried in oblivion. Yet they were not alone in their guilt, though as forming the administration in power, theirs was the gravest offence. Their responsibility was shared in a greater or less degree by Mr. Asquith, by the so-called leaders of the Labour party, and by the prelates and clerics (not excluding Archbishops) who so petulantly called for the fatal truce with murder and hampered the operations of our troops and the R.I.C. against the murder gang. All these gentlemen have to stand in the dock with Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Birkenhead. All helped to make the crime possible. None of them has denounced it as it should have been denounced. Not one of them has demanded steps which would put

down the murder gang in this country. They can see from the terms in which various Irish leaders have spoken of the murder that Sinn Fein is behind it all. The knowledge leaves them comparatively calm.

Not less amazing was the attitude of Mr. Lloyd George after he had obtained information of one of the most hideous deeds in the hideous story of tribal Ireland—the torture and cold-blooded, cowardly hanging of three young British officers and a private, kidnapped at Macroom months after the "Truce," weeks after the "treaty," and miserably abandoned to their fate by the Coalition Government after they had been exposed to terrible danger by its criminal negligence. In horror and incredibility this episode surpasses all the previous Irish outrages. A detachment of British troops ascertained that the four officers and men were in Macroom Castle. They went back. The news must have been communicated to the Coalition Government, but it issued no orders, though it must well have known that its whole attitude had been hostile to any repression or punishment of Irish crimes, and that this would necessarily react on its subordinates. A few days later another party was despatched, only to be warned, before Macroom Castle was reached, that the road was mined and the tribal Irish waiting in ambush. This detachment returned. Again the Coalition Government took no action. It might have instantly arrested four Sinn Feiners as host-

ages for its servants' safety. It did nothing of the kind. The British troops were withdrawn. When questioned in the House of Commons, Ministers professed to have made "representations" to the "Free State" Government.\* The House of Commons, in justice to men who were wearing the King's uniform, ought to call for the publication of those "representations" in a white paper, so that the country may see of what character they were, and whether these Ministers were as enormously guilty as appears on the surface. I have yet to hear of any telegram of condolence or sympathy sent by the authorities to the families of the murdered soldiers, though they perished in the King's and the nation's service; and I have watched, so far in vain, for any utterance from the English and Irish prelates, from the Non-conformist Ministry, from Mr. Asquith, or from the Labour leaders denouncing this horror. Is killing no murder when the victims are English soldiers, when they wear the national uniform, and when their butchers are of tribal Irish provenance? Or does Mr. Lloyd George carry his secret animosity against our fighting men to the pitch of sacrificing them callously in the hour of supreme peril?

Mr. Asquith's guilt in this miserable Irish business is immense, though it is not, like

\* They shamefully misled the House of Commons by pretending that the officers were taking a "joy-ride" whereas actually they were on duty. Mr. Chamberlain owes an apology to the Army and to the dead for his mis-statement.

the Cabinet's, complicated by the stain of treachery. It is a deplorable fact that on three of the most tremendous issues with which British statesmanship has ever had to deal, his policy has made complete shipwreck and involved his country in fearful loss and suffering. His first catastrophic failure was before the Great War, when, knowing the right course, he had not the moral courage to take it, and neither warned nor armed the nation. His second was in his careless encouragement of separatism and in the Gallio-like temper which allowed Sinn Fein to take root, till it gathered such strength that in 1916 it openly attacked the Allied cause. His third error was in his continued encouragement of Sinn Fein after he had been ejected from office. He constituted himself its advocate; he even apologized for it; and he violently denounced the policy of reprisals, which he must have well known was both justified and was the only means of getting murder under control. As Sir Hamar Greenwood said in 1920, at a time when he was blowing hot against Sinn Fein, with special reference to this campaign of Mr. Asquith's, "every speech is an encouragement to assassination." All dispassionate observers who were in Ireland in the critical months of 1920-1 are agreed that, if the reprisals policy had been maintained and officially enforced, it would have ended Sinn Fein. There was strong evidence to this effect from the Sinn Fein side in the documents

seized, which lamented the unwillingness of the conspirators to face the risk of retaliation. The Southern Irish are not good fighters, as has been shown by their conduct in the present "civil war"; they excel in ambushes and assassinations, not in open combat where danger has to be incurred. "You will see that the possibilities of a fight for more than ten minutes do not exist," said one of the Sinn Fein dispatches captured in 1920 by the police: "I take it that, if we once strike, we will be struck back (*sic*) in a much more damaging fashion." And therefore Sinn Fein adopted the tactics which were justly denounced by Mr. Lloyd George in his speech of December 3, 1920:

Treachery—murder, cowardly murder by men apparently unarmed, apparently harmless, dressed like civilians, who are allowed to come and go as if they were under the protection of the police, the police regarding them as part of the citizens whom they are prepared to defend, and when the policeman passes on, he is shot in the back—cowardly, mean murder.

If Mr. Asquith and his ecclesiastical friends had given any attention to the question of reprisals before intervening with their factious advice, they would have been aware that on July 30, 1863, President Lincoln signed a famous order: "For every soldier of the United States killed in violation of the laws of war, a rebel soldier shall be executed." They would have learnt that during the American Civil War, in October 1862, when

a loyal citizen of Palmyra, Missouri, was kidnapped and murdered, the local United States commander sent a flag of truce to demand the surrender of the murderers, and when this did not take place, after full warning, executed in reprisals ten guerillas. By these methods did the United States Government stop crime under the wisest and most humane statesman of modern times.

Now Mr. Asquith has the satisfaction of knowing that his policy has been adopted, and with what results ! Over a thousand British soldiers and Irish police have been murdered or dangerously wounded by assassins in Ireland ; the United Kingdom has been destroyed ; the Union Jack has been torn up ; vast expenditure has been incurred ; a British trade tenfold that with Russia in the palmiest days before the war has been wrecked ; tariffs are about to be set up within the "Free Trade area" of the British Isles ; a land frontier has been created which has to be guarded by 50,000 troops ; in Ireland armed bands under various labels fight one another for the possession of Dublin, and outside it burn barracks and orphanages, blow up buildings, ravage loyalist property, destroy railway bridges, and show how correct was the separatist view of Irish amiability ! With the withdrawal of British rule it is no exaggeration to say that Southern Ireland has reverted two centuries. Nor has England gained anything by this tame surrender of right. She was never so fiercely hated, and

the slightest suggestion of friendship for her is repudiated by all the Irish factions. Worst of all, outrageous political crime has spread from Ireland to this country; and has been met here with the same methods of lazy and apathetic toleration that gave Sinn Fein its opportunity across the Irish Channel. Such are the results of accepting Mr. Asquith's advice.

The Labour Party co-operated with Mr. Asquith in his campaign against his own country, entirely indifferent to the fact that it was thereby helping to cripple British trade and diminish employment. It denounced the Army and the police, as is its normal custom. The very party that had embraced Lenin and defended Bolshevik methods, which are those of the most ruthless and brutal tyranny enforced by thousands of executions and by torture, professed to be shocked at occasional retaliation in Ireland for cruel murder. It sent a deputation to Ireland which, after the briefest and most perfunctory of inquiries, reported that the British Government was wrong and Sinn Fein was right. Not one word of sympathy was expressed for the unhappy families of the murdered constabulary, though, during the stay of the deputation in Ireland, police were being assassinated or brutally injured at the rate of one a day. The secret of the Labour attitude was in a corrupt deal which the Labour Party made with the Irish separatists in December, 1919, by which the Irish vote in British

constituencies was to be given for Labour, on condition that Labour in the House of Commons supported separatism. This it has done with unfailing regularity. The Labour Party, in fact, is not an independent party, or British. Its official newspaper, the *Daily Herald*, has admittedly accepted money from Lenin, and has been subventioned by all the enemies of the British Empire from Sinn Fein and the Egyptian revolutionaries to the Indian anarchists. Mr. Clynes might write to Lady Wilson deplored Sir Henry Wilson's murder, but the fact remains that the Labour policy led straight up to that crime.

The directest encouragement to murder came, however, from Coalition Ministers, and in two ways. In the first place, by their attitude to murderers they blotted out the moral stain of murder, and made it seem profitable and even glorious. Mr. Lloyd George's lunches at Genoa to the Bolsheviks, whose hands were dripping with human blood, were a great shock to decent, law-abiding English people. An even greater shock was his attitude to De Valera and Michael Collins. De Valera had publicly proclaimed from American soil his warm approval of the assassination of the British officers in Dublin on November 21, 1920. Collins was not only a principal in the murder organization, but also a traitor. The son of a small farmer of Woodfield, County Cork, he had been quite ready to take money from the British Government, which, if he had been a genuine Irish patriot,

he would never have done. From 1914 to early 1916 he was employed in a Government office in London. He was, in fact, a sorter at the General Post Office, and only fled from London when compulsory service was introduced. He next appeared in Dublin as a virulent Sinn Feiner, who preached violence, but avoided exposing himself. He was taken during the rebellion of April, 1916, when a small force of British troops put down the rebels, and was interned in England, whence, with others like himself, he was presently released by the mischievous leniency of the British Government, which allowed it thus to be known that treason and insurrection were regarded in London as venial offences.

Returning to Ireland, he made incendiary speeches and directed the murder organization. Sir Hamar Greenwood read to the House of Commons in 1920 Sinn Fein documents, which had been captured, and which showed that Collins's staff offered £100 "for the skull of every policeman or soldier." Through Collins's hands passed £371,000 subscribed in America for the Irish republican loan, from which fund the murderers were paid for their crimes, their legal expenses defrayed, and their release arranged by bribery (when the British Government could not be induced to let them out, which it usually did). For weeks he was "on the run" from the police, and during this period he contracted the curious trick of suddenly stopping, as he walked, and looking round suspiciously. He

was described by Sir Hamar Greenwood as "the centre of the murder gang." Sir Henry Wilson, as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, well knew Collins's record and regarded it with horror; and his breach with Mr. Lloyd George came when he found one day in No. 10 Downing Street the Prime Minister joking cheerfully with a man whom he viewed as an assassin.

Since the truce and since the treaty, Collins's behaviour was not such as to deserve any encomiums. He said for example, on March 5th, that the Treaty was only a device by which to trick the British; "when they had beaten them out by means of the Treaty, the republican ideal which was surrendered in July (at the truce) was restored." He added that "the difference between themselves and their (republican) critics was, as they admitted themselves, the difference of a shadow." He concluded in May what even Mr. Churchill, one of our Coalition "quitters" who will swallow anything in "credulous good faith," described as "a doubtful pact, doubtfully made," to rob the people of Southern Ireland of their freedom at the elections in that country, and which other and less timid judges characterized as a treacherous agreement with the open advocate of violence and of an independent Irish republic. For weeks he looked on and permitted Rory O'Connor to hold the Four Courts in Dublin with a gang of bandits, without lifting a finger. Nominally controlling the "regular"

Irish republican army, which had its headquarters at Beggar's Bush Barracks, from which Mr. A. W. Cope\* had ejected the British troops to make way for these "regulars," he allowed the "regulars" to wage a systematic guerrilla war on Ulster with pistol and incendiary bomb, as has been proved by the documents which, in June, were captured by the Belfast police in Falls-road, Belfast, at "the headquarters of the 1st battalion, 1st brigade, 3rd northern division, I.R.A."

Collins, moreover, made no move against the freebooters at the Four Courts until they attacked him, and until he was driven to action by an ultimatum from the British Government, which in its turn was driven to act by the deep and just public indignation in England at Sir Henry Wilson's murder. The murder took place on Thursday, June 22nd, and was to be the subject of a debate in the House of Commons on Monday, June 26th. Immediately after it, Mr. Bonar Law took a step which filled the Government with alarm. He was bound to the dead soldier by years of friendship; with Sir Henry he had enabled Mr. Asquith in August, 1914, to out-maneuvre Mr. Lloyd George, when the present Prime Minister was demanding British

\* The record of this official will be found in C. J. C. Street's *Ireland in 1921*, just published, and it suggests strange thoughts. While nominally serving the British Government he was, apparently, in close touch with the Sinn Fein outlaws.

neutrality in the war. Moved by horror at a fearful crime and by indignation at the terrible results which had followed the Government's surrender in Ireland, he let Mr. Lloyd George know pretty plainly what he thought ; and those in the secret were aware on Saturday, June 24th, that there was another possible Prime Minister at the starting post, and this, too, a man who could by a gesture rally to his side practically the entire Conservative party. The Government, in fact, itself received an ultimatum. So alarmed was Mr. Lloyd George that he at once telegraphed on that Saturday to his friend, Michael Collins. This telegram, in the words of a Coalition organ, "pressed them (the Provisional Government) to establish order in their own house and to consent no longer to a double sovereignty in Ireland." It was further arranged by the Cabinet that Mr. Churchill should early in the debate make a speech of a distinctly threatening kind, to satisfy Mr. Bonar Law and keep the House of Commons and the English public quiet, while Mr. Lloyd George, at the close of the debate, to placate Collins, would appeal for "calm," which in this case meant inaction against the people behind the campaign of crime in England. The speeches, says the same Coalition organ, "were meant to meet a particular emotional crisis caused by the murder of Sir Henry Wilson." They were, in fact, "dope" to get the Government out of a grave crisis.

The telegram went on June 24th ; the

speeches were made on June 26th, and early on June 28th Collins had to act, for probably even he recognized that his tremulous friends in power in London would very quickly disappear if something were not done. There followed the sluggish and halting attack on the gang in the Four Courts, which would have been taken in a few hours by a company of British or French storm troops. Many proclamations accompanied the skirmishing, in the course of which enormous damage was done to Dublin. The loss on either side was trifling. The munitions used by Collins were British, supplied at the cost of the English taxpayer; and the English public will note with the gravest anxiety that the Irish Republican Army has been supplied not only with tanks (though our tank force in the British Army has been reduced to a shadow of a shade, and is composed mostly of antiquated machines) but also with artillery, field howitzers and aircraft. The British Air Force is in a lamentable state of disorganization and weakness, but our rulers had machines to spare for Collins, though there is no security that these machines will not sooner or later be used against Ulster or this country. For as Mr. Lloyd George said at Carnarvon on October 9, 1920:

If satisfying the present opinion of Ireland is an essential condition of settlement, there is only one thing you can do—cut Ireland adrift, cut the painter, let them set up an independent republic, an absolutely independent nation. And that won't satisfy them. They will want Ulster. . . .

There would be the danger that in England's trouble they might achieve independence and satisfy an old feeling of vengeance for past wrongs.

So lethargic were the operations against the Four Courts that anxiety was aroused in the House of Commons, and Mr. Churchill with the best display of indignation that he could simulate, had to insist that Collins was really doing his utmost. Meantime, De Valera entered the engagement, and in the face of Collins's feebleness seized a part of Sackville Street, which had just been rebuilt with the English taxpayer's money, after its destruction by these same rebels in 1916. Another prolonged skirmish took place, resulting in further destruction of property and the escape of the most important rebels. The real military situation in Southern Ireland has been hidden from the world—and from the British Government—by a Sinn Fein censorship, while the circulation of British newspapers in Southern Ireland is forbidden by both sides. What we do know is that fighting of a guerrilla kind is proceeding over most of Southern Ireland. That country has sunk to a state of anarchy which would disgrace a negro community. The railways have been systematically destroyed—no doubt in the belief that Mr. Churchill and Mr. Lloyd George will produce English money with which to rebuild them. "Rebel" prisoners escape, or are liberated or rescued. Loyalists are mercilessly attacked and subjected to such infamous outrages as the raping of a woman by eight

Sinn Feiners in the presence of her husband, described by Lord Carson in the House of Lords. Such are some of the early consequences of "shaking hands with murder." With what face could Mr. Churchill contend, on June 26th, that "assassination will not change the course of British policy," when assassination secured the "truce" of July, 1921, the craven surrenders of the Ministry in the negotiations with Sinn Fein, and the concession to Southern Ireland of powers which Mr. Lloyd George had himself previously declared ruinous and dangerous to the safety of England?

The second great encouragement to murder in England which the Coalition gave was by its conduct in failing sternly to repress the crimes of 1920-1 in Great Britain, and to take adequate measures against the people behind them in this country and in Southern Ireland. A considerable number of these miscreants had been captured and sentenced in 1921. They had been guilty of the gravest offence known to modern society—stealthily attempting to murder and to burn under cover of civilian dress. Forty-three such crimes were perpetrated by them around London, and a large number in other parts of the country. They were treated by the Government, not as incendiaries and criminals, but as "political prisoners." One batch of them was released on February 11th for crimes committed before the "truce." Another batch, who had continued to levy war on this country

even after the "truce," were released on April 11th, in Mr. Shortt's words, "as the result of a Cabinet decision and as part of the general policy of amnesty in respect of all crimes which had been committed from a political motive." Thus the Government treated arson, murder and attacks on the English people as a mere joking matter, and taught the desperadoes to believe that their immunity was assured. It is quite certain that the police were discouraged from showing any activity in watching them and dealing with them.

Not only this, but though the Government must have known that Sir Henry Wilson's life was in danger (and it was notorious, whatever Mr. Shortt says, that he had received threatening letters), police protection was withdrawn from him; and such police as were stationed near his house were left unarmed. Yet the Cabinet had very distinct notice that something was brewing. That notice was given by the Sinn Fein raids in Lancashire on collieries for explosives early in June which ought to have shaken Ministers out of their complacent negligence. They never lifted a finger. No scrutiny was directed upon the Government departments which contain many Sinn Feiners, some of them placed very high up. There were no searches or raids on the well-known centres of sedition. Sir Hamar Greenwood and Mr. Lloyd George were carefully guarded, but for the lives of others there were no precautions of any kind.

It may or may not be true that the police gave no hint of any conspiracy (though they did warn Mr. Shortt that robberies of arms and explosives and an outbreak of incendiaryism was coming), but then two facts must be taken into consideration in weighing this excuse which has been advanced by the Government. The first is that vigilance was not stimulated by Downing Street, and the second that there are believed to be unreliable elements high up in the police force. I should be very much surprised if the Government was not informed of this during the war from the Naval and Military Intelligence Departments, where there were chiefs who were not afraid to do their duty. It was a curious fact that when a most important raid had to be carried out in the war to secure certain vital documents, it had to be carried out by the military authorities without the knowledge of the police. This factor may explain why in the raids which followed the murder of Sir Henry Wilson more material was not secured. It is known definitely that a band of "fire-bugs" and assassins, named the "Irish Expeditionary Force," exists in this country under the direction of heads in Dublin; and that some of its chiefs are in Government offices. With a little energy, and if the authorities had the necessary courage, these people could be quickly tracked down. But what was the use of tracking them down when they were invariably let out a few weeks later under an "amnesty"?

If the Coalition had done its bare duty, it would have taken instant steps to strengthen the law against these criminals, and to give the loyal and peaceable people of England protection against them. After all, their safety should come before consideration for the feelings of Michael Collins. The first measure required is one directed against flagrant conspirators, caught red-handed. The possession of incendiary bombs or explosive bombs is the clearest possible evidence of an intention to commit arson or murder. Any person with such bombs should be required (as any person in South Africa found in possession of diamonds is required) to prove his or her innocence. No honest or law-abiding person wants or keeps such bombs ; and the penalty for their possession should be death—or flogging, if a death sentence is thought inadvisable.\* It is not a trifling matter. Enormous damage was done by these Southern Irish criminals in England last year, and when they were caught they were, as we have seen, very soon let loose. In these tactics of masked crime the Southern Irish excel. Their record in the United States is a terrible one. The ruffians of the I.W.W. whom the American detective Burns tracked down at the risk of his life for a series of outrages committed with explosives, were almost without exception Irish, as is seen from

\* In Ulster the "cat" is being used on such offenders. In Southern Ireland republicans caught with arms are now (October 1922) threatened with death.

such names as McNamara, Sullivan, McGraw, McManigal, Ryan, Clancy, and Curran.

In the second place, effective steps should be taken to purge the English departments of Southern Irish conspirators and spies. By levying war on the English people they are guilty of treason, for which the penalty is death ; and that penalty should be enforced when persons in British Government employment take English money and use their positions of privilege for treacherous attacks on English lives and property. It is a simple outrage that while thousands of loyal English officers and men who fought for the national cause in the Great War are walking the streets in vain in the search for employment, our Government departments here in England should be over-run by these alien conspirators. The heads of the departments should be held responsible for the character of persons they employ or engage ; and definite guarantees of those employees' good faith and loyalty should be secured. By their speech they can be known. I have good reason for stating that many of these people habitually talk treason. Further, as Southern Ireland has now become a separate State, it should be a principle that no Southern Irish or person of South Irish descent shall be allowed to enter Government or municipal service without satisfactory proof that they can be trusted. How many Englishmen, I should like to ask, are now employed in Southern Irish offices ? Perhaps some Die-hard M.P. will put a

question on this head and force the facts out.

This matter is not unimportant. Threatening letters were sent wholesale in the summer of 1922 declaring that the punishment of the men charged with Sir Henry Wilson's murder would be followed by "terrible reprisals." The struggle between the Republicans and the Free State levies for the time being seems to have interfered with the criminals' plans. But English life may at any moment be attacked by a far-reaching organization, with ample funds at its service, with headquarters in Ireland beyond the reach of our police, and with abundance of arms, supplied by the "credulous good faith" of our Mr. Copes and Mr. Churchills. Such an organized attack can only be met and defeated by organized power in this country. The centre of organized power, if it is to be legally exerted, is the British Government, which, while it was in Coalition hands, was preparing once more to betray the English nation. All that it did was to announce that it would not be deflected from its path by murder, just as Sir Hamar Greenwood announced on November 24, 1920 :

We should be traitors, to my mind, to ourselves and to Ireland if we hesitated for a moment in our stern plan of stamping out this campaign of assassination in Ireland.

Just as Mr. Lloyd George announced that he would not take the risk of giving Southern Ireland an army, and an air force, and a

navy "through fear of any murder gang." We know what has come of these boasts. When he appealed, as he did in his speech of June 26th, to England to show "composure, judgment and firmness" and to "preserve calm," he was in fact calling on this country to trust to the very methods which he employed in Ireland down to the surrender, in pretending that there was no danger, in being calm and magnanimous, in refusing to see a conspiracy when one plainly existed, in adopting the ostrich policy. There used to be a famous story of a young man in a theatre who, when the scenery caught fire and the audience were rising from their seats to go out, jumped on the stage and adjured all to "keep calm and sit still." Whereupon the audience resumed their seats, kept calm, sat still, and were one and all burnt to death. It was not by such methods that the Irish Invincibles, who murdered Lord Frederick Cavendish and Mr. Burke, and the Dynamiters were defeated. But it was by the precise parallel to this policy of calm and doing nothing that Kerensky allowed the Bolsheviks to establish their power and ruin Russia, and Mr. Lloyd George saddled Ireland with the curse of Sinn Fein.

Mr. Churchill and other Ministers have bravely threatened that, if the Sinn Fein authorities in Southern Ireland do not suppress anarchy and outrage, something very dreadful will be done by the Coalition Government. Whether they are in earnest is most

doubtful. They themselves have deliberately destroyed the whole machinery by which order can be restored. As Mr. Churchill said on May 31st :

We have disbanded our police. We have withdrawn our armies. We have liberated our prisoners. Yes, I say it and I boast it. . . . Let us on our part be very careful that we do all we have to do . . . in scrupulous, meticulous, and even—if I may dare the word—in credulous good faith.

They have left the Southern Irish free to fortify their "creeks and harbours," control of which Mr. Lloyd George declared on November 11, 1920, to be "vital to Britain"; which on October 9th of the same year he pronounced to be "the gateway of Great Britain." Protesting as the Prime Minister did against the idea that Ireland should have a navy, with submarines, submarine bases and mines ("they are cheap," he said, on October 9, 1920, "and those under full and complete Home Rule Ireland can have"), he has given them the right to have that navy as well as an air force, so that it will be able to operate athwart the British trade routes, by which the English population obtains its food and raw materials. Even the all-important cable station at Valentia and the wireless station at Clifden were abandoned to the tender mercies of a "Provisional Government" which had neither the will nor the power to maintain order, with the result that in June both stations were attacked and damaged.

Mr. Lloyd George has further armed the Sinn Fein troops with weapons and aircraft paid for by the English people, though there is definite evidence that some of these weapons, notably the Crossley tenders surrendered to the I.R.A., were shortly after used against Ulster.\* He has created a land frontier which can only be held with extreme difficulty; and by the provisions of that "Treaty," to which Mr. Churchill adjures us to cling "meticulously," while they are daily broken by Sinn Fein, he has placed every obstacle in the way of the Ulster Government. As Lord Carson said with absolute justice, "you have tried to make her (Ulster's) position impossible, and, what is more, I believe you have told the Sinn Fein delegates so."

There is no half-way house between reassertion of the Union and complete Irish separation. If British troops are to be employed to recover Ireland for civilization, in which case I make bold to say they will have the sympathy of four-fifths the Southern Irish people, well and good. In that case, however, no one can trust the Coalition Government † to undo the evil it has done: we must have a new administration. But if our soldiers are to be used to aid one of the Irish factions in its fight against the others, in setting up Cosgrave or in putting down De Valera, and in

\* It would be interesting to know where the Sinn Fein "gunboat" came from, which in July appeared in Lough Swilly, and who paid for her.

† Happily, it has since fallen.

maintaining the "Provisional Government," this would be a monstrous sacrifice of loyal British lives.

Mr. Churchill, it appears, offered the aid of British troops in Dublin to Collins, during Collins's short period of power, only to receive a rebuff and to have that aid refused, with insolence. What right had he to do this? He suggested that as British troops were freely at the disposal of the Ulster Government, so they should be freely at the disposal of the Southern Irish Government—or what passes for government. The suggestion ignores the total difference between Ulster and Southern Ireland. Ulster remains an integral part of what was once the United Kingdom, having resisted every attempt by British Ministers to drive her out. She pays our enormous income tax (from which Southern Ireland is to be liberated, as we know from the Coalition Press). She contributes her full quota to the cost of the British Army. Southern Ireland is a State entirely aloof, subject, as Mr. Lloyd George said in his speech of June 26th, only to the provisos that it "must remain within the Empire and that there must be no coercion of Ulster." It has therefore no right whatever to British military or naval aid in its intestine quarrels; it makes no contribution whatever to the cost of British defences; there is little probability that it will pay anything for the cost of Irish Land Purchase or the interest on the National Debt.

The right course to take is to forbid any development of an Irish navy or air force, until ample security for Southern Ireland's good behaviour has been given, in view of recent happenings. Evidence that the "Provisional Government" is a Government and not an organized anarchy will only be given, if it puts down outrage, protects and compensates loyalists, hangs murderers—among them the ruffians guilty of the Macroom crime—stamps out the guerrilla bands which are attacking Ulster, and seizes and punishes the people at the head of the murder organization, which has wide ramifications in England. These people are well known. The present rulers of the Free State were engaged with them in their campaign of 1920-1, for which they supplied the funds, and they can lay hands on them—if they choose. They have only to go through the secret records of their forces to ascertain the names of the people directing the attack on Ulster. A further test of the "Provisional Government's" good faith will be its attitude to De Valera and O'Connor. If the present Free State Government follows the lead given by the British Government and lets them go, then there can be little doubt as to the real value of such professions as have been extracted from it.

If Sinn Fein continues its present methods, after due warning, there is no other course but to impose a strict naval blockade on Southern Ireland. The British troops would

be withdrawn from Dublin, and a barbed wire fence \* would have to be carried round the Ulster frontier, protected by pill-boxes, and by such other arrangements as are necessary for military security. The Southern Irish would be informed that any raid or attack on Ulster would be punished by reprisals, of the same kind as those enforced against Indian frontier tribes, and that any attack on British shipping or any use of mines or submarines would be treated with the utmost severity. The only argument against such a policy is that it would sacrifice the loyalists of the South. Unfortunately, they have already been flung to the wolves by Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Austen Chamberlain, who have so arranged matters that it is beyond our power to protect them, though we can punish crimes against them if those crimes become known. The danger which this country has to face is the development of a bankrupt, semi-Bolshevik community at its very doors, but a strict blockade would prevent the infiltration of Southern Irish criminals into this country. All persons who have since 1913 migrated from Southern Ireland to Great Britain should be required to register.† Many of them are loyalists, but such registration would enable the police to keep an eye on dangerous men.

\* This will in any case be necessary for fiscal reasons—another example of the curse of separatism.

† This is important as hundreds of Sinn Feiners poured into Glasgow in 1915–16 to replace loyal Scots—who were conscripted—in the munition works.

If there still remain any remnants of devotion to law and order in Southern Ireland, such a policy would strengthen the hands of those who oppose murder and anarchy. But let us not for a moment suppose that the way is going to be smooth. Sir Henry Maine, that great thinker and legislist, spoke the truth when he said :

If any government should be tempted to neglect, even for a moment, its function of compelling obedience to law—if a democracy, for example, were to allow a portion of the multitude of which it consists to set some law at defiance which it happens to dislike—it would be guilty of a crime which hardly any other virtue could redeem, and which century upon century might fail to repair.


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Morgan, John Hartman  
The man who didn't  
win the war

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